Next, as is said even of the President of the United States, the critics of our Vietnam involvement have been much too influenced by the polls. These I do not doubt show correctly the reaction of people to the war. They show the national, deeply-conditioned tendency to rally to the flag. But the polls do not show depth of feeling. They do not show ability to articulate feeling -- to persuade. They do not show length of memory. They do not indicate who will write the history and draw the lessons. They do not always show where youth and thus the next generation stand. If those who feel deeply, remember long, can persuade others and who will be the next electorate are opposed, it may not matter too much that they are a minority.

As noted, our wars in the past have been fought on something close to unanimity rule. And they have always had the part of the population that now opposes in full support. That it is wise to act in neglect of the informed, articulate and young -- that they can be ignored as somehow morally as well as numerically inferior -- is far from proven. On the contrary, it is likely to be rembered as one of the cardinal political errors of modern times. In American life, it has long been my observation that the intellectual, so-called, is fashionably dismissed as a serious factor in all the battles except the last.

The critics of our Vietnam involvement have also been too ready to imagine that the opposition in Hanoi is eager to oblige Americans of humane inclination by entering negotiations on whatever terms we believe convenient. This is unduly optimistic and also dangerous. Let me be clear on one thing. There is not the slightest doubt that overtures to negotiate have been made. And these have not involved the precondition of withdrawal. I urge all officials who may be tempted to deny this that credibility is not something lightly to be tossed away.

But it is a mistake to base policy on any particular assumption as to the behavior and intentions of Hanoi or the leaders of the National Liberation Front. We do not know the enemy that well. Certainly it is a mistake to imagine that they are only waiting to oblige Americans of good-will. Such assumptions can be undermined by events. And it is very easy for those who are hostile to the idea of a negotiated settlement, those who want a military solution, so to handle our relations with Hanoi and the NLF and so to gauge and present their responses and non-responses that those who disagree -- you and I and our friends -- are left well out on a limb. If we can have negotiations on equitable terms, that much to be desired. And the hope that this will be possible justifies the emphasis placed upon it in the title of this organization and by all here assembled. But there must be something more.

There must also be a policy that allows of stubborness, suspicion, ill-will, obtuseness, and the waywardness of internal political struggle on the part of those with whom we are involved. No one, after all, would counsel Hanoi to repose high hopes in negotiations with Nguyen Cao Ky. Any policy which relies on negotiation is a policy that is at least partly at the mercy of others. We must also have a course of action which is within the scope of our own authority. We must invite negotiations. We must have a better policy than mindless escalation should negotiations prove not to be possible.

Critics Exaggerate

This brings me to my final point of criticism of my fellow critics. They exaggerate the difficulties in finding an alternative course of action to the one we have been following. This tragedy has continued so long that they have come to believe that the alternatives have now disappeared. "Perhaps something could have been done earlier. Now it is too late." This is wrong -- as well as morally weak. Alternatives to continued and deepening involvement exist. They have even been made somewhat more feasible by the march of events. Let me, as the last step in this lengthy exercise, outline a feasible course of action which reduces our commitment in Vietnam to sensible proportions, protects the larger peace, conserves our national interest and, what could perhaps be more important, reflects the interest of the sadly beset and tortured people of this part of the world. And it is a policy that does not depend on the cooperation of Hanoi and the NLF, although should that be forthcoming all would be much eased.