"The central issue of the crisis is the announced determination to impose a world of coercion upon those not already subject to it ... it is posed between the Sino-Soviet empire and all the rest, whether allied or neutral; and it is posed on every continent..."

This was an accepted view at the time. None thought Mr. Rusk's formulation other than commonplace. He and others repeated the thesis--the doctrine of a centrally controlled and disciplined power guided from Moscow -- dozens of times. Implicit therein was a pattern of policy and of action. This had immediate relevance to Vietnam.

Thus to assume a unitary and evangelical force was inevitably to urge a policy of resistance. And resistance would have to be everywhere on the Communist perimeter. To allow transgression in one place would, most plausibly, be to encourage it elsewhere. And here we have the foundation for the analogy to Munich which for a long time played such a dominant role in the Vietnam discussion. Given the assumptions the analogy was persuasive.

The Sino-Soviet power being imperial and coercive, it was necessary also to assume that it would never be welcomed by those who might be subject to it. It could not reflect national aspiration; this was a flat contradiction in terms. Communist power might seek to exploit social grievance. But this, it was assumed, would only be a tactic designed to win subservience to the ultimate imperial and conspiratorial purpose. And this being so, no nation should yield to such tactics even when the grievance--as might often happen--was real.

Far better that people stay in a less enduring state of exploitation than to pass forever into this all-embracing system of coercion. This means, further, that we could not be particular as to whom we might support; even the most nauseous non-Communist dictator was preferable to the enduring Communist imperialism. And even if the Communists had seduced a majority of the population it was doubtful that we should yield. Rather that we should try to win them back. The liberal strategist in this conflict set great store by ameliorative social action. Conservatives tended to place rather more reliance on a gun.

Given this view of the world struggle -- and none I think will feel it an unfair summary of official attitudes in the early sixties -- our intervention in Vietnam was wholly understandable. Let me go further and say that it was inevitable. It was unfortunate but not decisive that the governments we supported, in their commitment to democracy and humane civilized values, left much to be desired. It was unfortunate but not decisive that our intervention was by something less than the popular demand of the people we aided.

Moreover, we had a right, given this view of the world, to expect two further and vital factors to be associated with our involvement. We had a right to expect that its necessity would be appreciated and supported by the American people -- as our economic and political intervention in Turkey and Greece and Western Europe following World War II were supported or as our military intervention in Korea in 1950 was supported. And it was reasonable to expect that the most effective support would come not from those who automatically rally to the flag when the guns sound but from the more introspective, informed and deliberative community -- those somewhat ambiguously styled the intellectuals -- who would best appreciate the long run consequences of short run weakness and appeasement. People of this inclination had given strong support to the Marshall Plan and to the Korean intervention. A generation earlier they had been in the very forefront of the criticism of Munich, the agreed symbol of surrender. So their support could be expected now.

Finally, given this view of the world, there was every reason to expect that the American initiative in Vietnam would be welcomed by the rest of the non-Communist nations. Previous initiatives had attracted such applause. The closer a nation to the danger, the greater the prospective applause; for one who could tell, after all, who was the next on the list. So the United States would both justify and enhance her claim to moral as well as economic and military leadership by assuming a commanding role in combatting the common menace in Indo-China.

III: Assumptions Have Dissolved

Merely to state the assumptions which lie behind this conflict is to show how completely they, and the resulting expectations, have been dissolved. History may not vouchsafe us sharp edges but, obviously, it can be a very blunt instrument.

We should perhaps remember, in this connection, that the assumptions which lay back of our Vietnam policy, including the concept of a unitary and all-embracing Communist imperialism, were never based on any very close knowledge of the subject. They were a formula, in some measure a theology, adopted by lawyers, businessmen, government officials and military men in the years of the Marshall Plan and NATO. Few of the authors had any first hand knowledge of Communism. Few had much experience of the political left. None had much experience of Asia. All were reacting to the current reality of Josef Stalin. To some extent it was a doctrine recited to justify the political and legislative action -- alliances, military appropriations, economic and military aid -- which the proponents thought necessary. There is nothing especially remarkable in the discovery that a doctrine so contrived failed to stand the test of history. History is respectful of truth but not of official truth.

New Developments

Since the basic decisions were taken to intervene in Vietnam the following has happened.

(1) The Communist world has come to pieces along national lines. The two great centers during the past years have, on occasion, been close to diplomatic breach.

(2) China, which the proponents of the Vietnam conflict for a while bravely pictured as the deus ex machina, is rent within itself. Its assumed puppet in Hanoi, likes its earlier puppet in North Korea, has publicly asserted its independence. Not even the most ardent defender of the war can now believe that Hanoi wants to be part of a Chinese-led empire.