(3) The people we fight in South Vietnam, it is now widely agreed, carry the banners of Vietnamese nationalism. They do this against former colonial officers whom we support. Gone, therewith, is the notion that people will rally to any alternative to Communism.

(4) Those we support, and Marshal Ky in particular, have their burlesque of democratic and constitutional process reduced their American supporters and onetime defenders to an embarrassed silence. Gone is the notion that any alternative will be accepted in the United States. Marshal Ky's recently proclaimed view of the free elections which denies criticism to his opponents and promises military action against unwelcome winners was the coup de grace. I venture to think that he has now lost even his honorary membership in what are often called the forces of freedom.

(5) The assumption that we could count on the applause and support of the other countries has disappeared. No European or American nation has rallied to our side. Few leaders dare speak in our favor. In Asia, propinquity to the assumed danger, the most aggressive arm-twisting has not brought us allies, only a few clients.

But it is not that we have failed to win support that is our misfortune. We have aroused by far the most massive hostility in our national experience. There is an underlying implication, never quite vouchsafed, that much of this opposition has been manufactured by Communists. If this is so, it is the most drastic of all indictments of our Vietnam enterprise for it shows what an unparalleled opportunity our enterprise has accorded the Communists for turning erstwhile friends into hostile critics. However, there is no reason to think that the Communists are this much involved. People have probably reacted in accordance with their own conclusions and their own conscience.

(6) Finally, with all else has gone the assumption that Americans could be rallied, more or less automatically, behind any war, however ill-considered, distant or cruel, provided only that Communists could be identified on the other side. Instead the American people have watched the collapse of the assumptions on which the Vietnam War was launched. In vindication of an intelligence none should mistrust, a very large number have reached the inevitable conclusion. The assumptions that took us there have been shown by the history to be false. Therefore we should not be there. The reasons that took us into the conflict having disappeared, why do we remain?

We remain, as all know, because men are human and do not like to concede, even to themselves, that they were wrong. Those who urged our intervention were associated with what could one day be regarded as the greatest miscalculation in our history. They remain in command. They are naturally reluctant to admit that their view of the world -- the view which counselled this vast effort -- has been shown to be wrong. And so, aided by the military momentum of the event itself, they continue. That is why we are now at war.

It also counsels us on our course. Let us, as moderates, urge that when a change of direction comes as it must, there will be no recrimination. Let us counsel those that are persisting in error that they are far more likely to compound the damage to their recrimination than to retrieve it. For that is what happens to men who persist in the face of fact.

IV: Errors Among the Critics

But there are stereotypes in the attitudes of those who are critics of our involvement in Vietnam. If one is detailing the miscalculations of those with whom he disagrees, it is salutary, also, to look for the errors of those with whom he agrees. It is most salutary of all, and in addition a trifle exceptional, to search for error in one's own past positions and attitudes.

Critics Not So Few

One grave error of those who criticize our involvement in Vietnam is to assume that we are a small and heroic and perilously situated minority. We are nothing of the sort. In times past in the United States popular opinion and official persecution have dealt rather harshly with dissent. Lives have been ruined and men silenced. There has always seemed some special liklihood of this when the primitive emotions of war have been released. But this does not happen and will not happen when vast numbers, including an overwhelming proportion of the young and the articulate, are involved. One wonders, indeed, if under such circumstances one should speak of dissent. Certainly martyrs do not march by the millions. This tendency to appropriate their cloak serves only to give a highly erroneous impression of the weakness of the opposition to our venture in Vietnam.

If anything, reflection should be on the reverse. There is no community concerned with foreign policy in the United States where the critic of our involvement in Vietnam is not accorded a warm and even enthusiastic hearing. There are quite a few where it is not deemed tactful or discreet for an official defender to appear. For the first time in our history this spring the spokesmen for our foreign policy found it necessary, in pursuit of this discretion, to avoid that fine old American folkrite, the commencement ceremony. Either too many students and too many faculty would be present or too many would obtrusively decline to be present. This is the situation on which we should reflect.

I think, also, that those who are critical of our involvement spend too much time worrying about the motives and tactics of those who share their goals. Second only to the fear that criticism will be suppressed is the fear of critics that they will be found in association with someone who, for whatever eccentric reason, has developed a latter day affection for Ho Chi Minh. This is silly. I do confess to wishing that all who are concerned about Vietnam would be more concerned with winning friends and influencing their fellow citizens in effective fashion.

I find myself also more than a little critical of those of my fellow critics who admit to a feeling of frustration and defeat in their efforts to influence the Administration on Vietnam. For one thing they have not been without influence. On the contrary, they have had a great deal.

Even within the Administration there are far more people who share our honest doubts than is commonly imagined. There are more now, I venture to think, than ever before. And one has only to ask, had there been no criticism, no objection, for that matter no demonstrations, where would we be in Asia now? What would have happened had those who are committed to the old stereotypes met with no objection? Where would those reputation lies with a military solution now be? Can anyone doubt that we would be far more deeply and dangerously involved than now?