Although it is clear that the Algerian government should have kept other stakeholders up to speed on its decided course of action, it is ridiculous and rather paternalistic to think that Western governments can teach the Algerian government how to deal with a terrorist situation. Medelci’s government has been combating terrorism and fundamentalist pan-Islamist groups for years, and has likely developed a substantially more comprehensive grasp of the risks of giving into terrorism than officials sitting in Tokyo, Oslo, or Bucharest have. Just as these foreign governments are right to prioritize the lives of their nationals, Algeria was right to look at the big picture and consider the long-term implications of negotiations in the cost benefit analysis of the situation. From a purely strategic point of view, negotiating publicly with terrorists is suicide. In the psychological game of poker that exists between terrorists and governments, negotiating is equivalent to revealing your hand in the middle of a bluff: It demonstrates susceptibility to pressure and sends out a message that, for the terrorists, staying in the game might just pay off. Additionally, it undercuts moderate forms of protest, empowers violence and invites a recurrence of actions. For Algeria, this could mean an ensuing blitz of attacks that would cost many more lives, drive away business and deal the already struggling country a devastating blow.

Now, can we deduce a general policy of non-negotiation with terrorists from this incident? I tend to think the answer is probably not. Despite grand declarations, in practice, most democratic governments—even the U.S. and Israel, both known for their uncompromising stance on the matter—negotiate with terrorists. An argument could be made for Israel, a country which has perhaps more experience than any other with terrorism, negotiating with Hamas. Sometimes a government might make a judgment call that the benefits of negotiating with terrorists surpass the costs. Israel’s decision to exchange 1,000 Palestinian prisoners with blood on their hands for the 1 abducted soldier Gilad Shalit was heavily criticized by Jewish communities worldwide as offering a reward to terrorism. Yet, Israel made a choice to go through with the deal so that every Israeli mother who sends her son or daughter into battle will know that in the event something terrible happens—a child falling captive, for example, the government will do all in its power to amend the situation.

What becomes clear is that the question of negotiating with terrorists is not a matter of principal but rather a matter of strategy. Despite a natural inclination for rules and generalizations, governments would be wise to acknowledge the fact that in these complex situations one size simply does not fit all.

Zaki Djemal ’15 is a social studies concentrator in Adams House.

Negotiating with Terrorists: Neither Rare Nor Bad Idea

Recent events in Algeria indicate that such crises (as also exemplified by the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis) should be handled with more prudence, both in the negotiation and, if necessary, military responses. I do believe governments should be open to negotiations with terrorist groups. This is not an atypical suggestion, however: governments already negotiate with terrorist organizations. The Guardian reports that, since 2008, Western governments have paid ransoms totaling between $40 and $65 million to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other factions for the release of nationals kept hostage. Furthermore, the French government attempted (unsuccessfully) to negotiate the release of intelligence agent Denis Allex from Al-Shabab for several years before attempting to rescue him (unsuccessfully) by force. An additional example can be seen by Israel’s occasional collaboration with Hamas—which both Tel Aviv and Washington define as a terrorist group—both in enforcing truces in Gaza and in an important prisoner exchange. Even the United States negotiated with the Taliban over a possible settlement of the Afghan situation, and the British and Spanish governments engaged the Irish Republican Army and Basque movements to resolve their own conflicts. This practice should not necessarily be undertaken in every occasion, nor is it always guaranteed success. However, automatically excluding the opportunity of a peaceful settlement to hostage or conflict situations leaves force—with the dangers it entails—as the only viable alternative. Governments should be scrupulous in examining every policy option before making a decision; this is a responsibility they owe both to affected citizens as well as to the soldiers who may be asked to intervene. One may be surprised to discover that there often is sufficient ground for an agreement, and establishing some sort of working relationship today may enable building some degree of reciprocal trust and help defuse worse situations tomorrow.

Giacomo Bagarella ’13 is a government concentrator in Currier House. He is the former co-chair of the Palestinian Solidarity Committee.

Politics is the Art of the Possible

On December 24 1999, a group of terrorists allegedly belonging to the Kashmir-based Harkat-ul-Mujahideen hijacked an Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu to Delhi. They flew the plane via Lahore and Dubai to Kandahar, where the Taliban, not quite yet international pariahs, offered to negotiate between the hijackers and the Indian government. Nearly 200 lives—passengers and crew—were at stake. India’s foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, secured the passengers’ release, but only by agreeing to the hijackers’ demands. Three prominent HUM allies, imprisoned by India for terrorism, were released.

Those three men were among the world’s most dangerous terrorists—including Ahmed Sheikh, who would go on to murder Daniel Pearl. India freed her citizens, but only at the cost of more terrorism. This incident is often seen in India as a pathetic capitulation, and as support for the popular maxim that one should never negotiate with terrorists. It can be contrasted with Operation Entebbe, the 1975 raid in which Israeli special forces stormed a Ugandan airport and rescued 102 out of 106 hostages being held by Palestinian hijackers.

But these two cases do not show that the right approach is to kill or capture terrorists, rather than negotiate with them. They prove, rather, Bismarck’s famous assertion that politics is the art of the possible. The Indian government could not have allowed 192 hostages to be killed. Alternatives to negotiation were considered and rejected as impractical. Operation Entebbe shows that, where possible, counterterrorism should come first, but “never negotiate with terrorists” is simply unsustainable as an inflexible rule of policy. Negotiating with terrorists must, at times, be resorted to where all other policies to prevent the loss of innocent life have failed or cannot be employed.

Keshava D. Guha ’13, a Crimson Books and Arts writer, is a social Studies concentrator in Leverett House.