Policy makers also agreed that the US still has a chance of preventing such developments through the provision of overt and covert political, military, economic, technical, diplomatic and public relations assistance to the current regime. However, if this effort failed to stabilize the local situation, the US would let it be known that it is prepared to and will use military force in conjunction with others, or, if necessary, unilaterally.

We consider these activities and the policies they imply to be dangerously misguided. Current policy, as we interpret it, is based on inaccurate intelligence, and on the suppression within various bureaucracies of verified contradicting information.

The options and recommendations on which policy decisions were made have been based on irresponsibly self-serving evaluations and analyses of intelligence reports available within the agencies. Critiques and dissenting views were systematically ignored.

B. An Alternate View of Regional and International Factors Affecting El Salvador

In this section we outline a characterization of the situation in El Salvador and its international context which is drastically different from the one commonly accepted within the Department.

The outline is based on a condensation of statements, commentaries, reports and memoranda available throughout various agencies of the government. We are not aware of any request for this information to be assembled for evaluation for for discussion.

1. El Salvador's domestic situation

* The governing Junta and the armed forces have failed to rally significant support for their reform and counter-insurgency programs.

* The land redistribution effort has failed to neutralize the peasant population and has not succeeded in isolating the guerrilla forces.

* The urban middle class is divided among those who have already chosen to side with the FDR opposition, those seeking to leave the country and those remaining neutral for the time being. Only a small fraction of this sector can be said to be committed to the survival of the current regime.

* Domestic and foreign businesses have nearly completed liquidating their assets and withdrawing their capital from the country. No significant private investment is taking place. Infusion of foreign assistance and loans is not having any significant impact on economic recovery.

* Conflict among members of the ruling coalition continues to spread. New defections from the Christian Democratic party and factional fighting among and within branches of the armed forces impede regime consolidation.

* The documented expansion of military capabilities of the opposition forces, including their ability to recruit and organize large contingents of displaced peasants, and to cause heavy casualties among government forces, makes it highly unlikely that a short term military defeat of the guerilla forces might be achieved.

* Neither the government nor the armed forces have been able to demonstrate their will or ability to avoid indiscriminate repression of civilian personnel thus contributing to the rapid deterioration of their image among the population and internationally.

2. Regional factors