Various government agencies have taken preparatory steps to intervene militarily in El Salvador. Policy makers appear to have concluded that such a move could succeed in preventing the collapse of the current regime.

Current policy consistently underestimates the domestic legitimacy and international support enjoyed by the opposition FDR/DRU coalition. Furthermore, policy makers fail to recognize the scope of military capabilities of opposition guerrilla forces and ignore the logistical value and potential impact of their support in neighboring countries.

Contingency scenarios for US military deployment tend to underestimates troop requirements, estimates of casualty rates, and the time and geographic scope of required engagement. Politico-military analysts downplay the potential for regionalization of armed conflict in the isthmus. In particular they underestimate the implications of the Nicaraguan and Cuban commitment to provide military support to Salvadorean guerilla forces in the event of continued escalation of US involvement. No serious consideration appears to have been given to global security implications of an escalated regional conflict involving US, Cuban, Nicaraguan, Venezuelan and other participants.

Diplomatic analysts overestimate the extent of current Venezuelan and Costa Rican commitment to continue to support our current policy in El Salvador. They also tend to minimize the political costs of world reaction to follow any increased deployment of US military personnel or equipment in the area.

The articulation of US policy for public and congressional audiences has misrepresented the situation in El Salvador emphasizing the viability of the current regime, downplaying its responsibility for the excesses being committed by security and paramilitary forces, exaggerating the positive impact of current reforms.

[A section of the Crimson's copy of the dissent paper is indecipherable at this point.]

Recommendations

A new policy towards El Salvador will have to address the following issues:

1. Recognition of the FDR/FDU. There can be no improvement of our negotiating position and no resolution to the current conflict without the US officially signaling the world community that it acknowledges that the FDR/DRU coalition is a legitimate and representative political force in El Salvador.

This recognition will be a key indicator to intransigent sectors on the left and the right that a real change of attitude has taken place in Washington.

2. Signal our willingness to abandon the confrontational track. Salvadorean and international public opinion perceive the US as being committed to a military solution in Central America. We must signal our willingness to abandon this course of action under certain conditions if an appropriate environment for negotiations is to emerge. To do so we must consider:

1) Taking actions which will clearly separate us from those sectors inside and outside the armed forces responsible for gross excesses against the population. The individuals involved have been identified by the FDR/DRU and by our own intelligence services.

2) Taking actions to reduce the level of military support we are currently providing to the armed forces, for example, by reducing or interrupting our training program and military supply flows.

3) Condemning the intervention plans of Guatemalan military and paramilitary forces and indicating our opposition to Honduran encouragement of hostile actions against Nicaragua.

4) Expressing privately and publicly our concern regarding continued involvement of Southern Cone countries in El Salvador and urging all our allies, including Israel, to act with caution in the region.