Q: Taiwan has been quite resentful of normalization. Do you see in the future a possibility of Taiwan opening up ties with the Soviet Union?

Walker: No, I really don't. This would be a very dangerous step for the Taiwanese, particularly given their heavy reliance on the U.S. for aid. I think we will see a gradual rapprochement--very long-term, much longer term than Teng has pronounced--between the Chinese and Taiwan, plus continued American support of Taiwan, if not in troops at least in military defensive supplies. We will also see pressure from the American government on the People's Republic of China, to take a gradual approach to Taiwanese relations, and not to aggravate the situation.

Bernstein: It seems to me that one has to point out that the Chinese did make--from their point of view--a concession, essentially saying they will tolerate the continued sale of defensive weapons on the part of the U.S. to Taiwan. The fact that that will continue--the Chinese say that they do not like it but that they will live with it--is absolutely essential as a guarantee of Taiwan's security in the future. This does suggest that the PRC is reconciled to de facto autonomy for Taiwan for the foreseeable future.

Walker: It's interesting, too, that Teng has pointed out that they will not forego the option of military incursions against Taiwan.

Bernstein: That's a question of fundamental national sovereignty, and if the premise is that Taiwan is a part of China, and I think that is an underlying premise, then I think it can be argued that it's unreasonable to expect them to renounce the use of force against what is part of their own country.

Walker: True. Looking at the People's Republic of China, it is highly unlikely that they could cross the several hundred miles separating them from Taiwan. They just don't have the amphibious landing capability in navy or air forces to do that.

Q: Is the Soviet-backed invasion of Cambodia a policy they should pursue to increase their influence in Asia, relative to China?

Walker: I really hoped we had gotten away from the domino theory in the last decade since Vietnam. What we are witnessing in southeast Asia is a series of very nationalistic movements, the most recent one being the Vietnamese reunited since the American pull-out in 1973. Granted the present situation has some Soviet support, and is a very exacerbating one for the Chinese; I think the American-chinese rapprochement may very well serve to slow down Chinese reaction to it, although the Chinese are massing troops along the Soviet border. I think it's hard to predict what will happen in southeast Asia; it's a group of very insecure governments, some supported by the Soviets and some by China.

Bernstein: From the Chinese point of view, the Soviets are engaged in an effort to establish a ring of non-friendly states around China. Some time ago they proposed an Asian security system; they have now signed treaties with a military component with Afghanistan, India, and now with Vietnam. The Chinese see this a very threatening development, and I think it is worth nothing that the invasion of Cambodia showed the Chinese up with clay feet: they weren't able to help their Cambodian ally. This put the Chinese in a very difficult position, and they may feel they need to assert themselves.

Walker: On the other hand we see a continued Soviet fear which is not new--ever since the 12th or 13th century Mongol invasion--of encirclement of themselves. We see the Soviets feeling an American-Japanese-West European encirclement. It's worth point out that if we were in the same position, we would seek to gain the respect and support of Afghanistan and surrounding regimes.

Nye: I think it's worth noting that if we had used the games metaphor of checkers instead of dominoes we would have come out in a much more correct position, saving 50,000 American lives and untold Vietnamese lives. There's an old adage in international politics that the enemy of my enemy is my friend: that has been known for centuries and it is rather sad that we got our games wrong.

Q: Does America still have a role to play in southeast Asia?

Nye: I think it definitely does and, in fact, is. The President just reaffirmed our commitment to the security of Thailand during the visit of the Thai prime minister. The United States had taken an interest in the local regional organization--the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--and has made efforts to be supportive there while at the same time seeing it primarily as a local, regional endeavor. We continue to have a military presence and base in the Philippines. I think there is definitely a feeling that an American presence in Southeast Asia will continue and is important but the extent of the involvement and the detail that we saw in the 1960s is unlikely to reoccur.

Q: Can American promises become empty? Senator Goldwater seems to feel that since we have "abandoned Taiwan" that American assurances of security and military assistance are no longer valid. How do you feel about that?

Nye: I'm not sure that I accept Senator Goldwater's premise that we've abandoned Taiwan." It seems to me that in the difficult game of balancing power, and enhancing American security balancing power, we've managed to do that without abandoning Taiwan.