Immediately afterwards, a State Department spokesman announced that had the talks been held, American representatives in Warsaw "had been instructed to make or renew constructive suggestions. These included consideration of an agreement on peaceful coexistence, consistent with our treaty obligations in the area, the subjects of exchange of reporters, scholars, scientists, and scientific information, and regularization of postal and telecommunications problems."
Analysis
AFTER THREE YEARS of unprecedented hostility toward the U.S. government, why did Peking make a friendly offer to negotiate? The change of administrations in Washington is an obvious answer. Peking showed the new President her desire to negotiate so as to ease hostilities. But on November 24, Nixon had publicly endorsed the old China Policy: was there, then, another important reason behind Peking's proposal? Perhaps the explanation is that the Chinese were land remains very uneasy over their northern boundary with the Soviets.
Another possible reason for Peking's proposal may have been that she wanted to trade with the U.S. In the republished report of March, 1949. Mao pointed out, "So far as possible, we must first of all trade with socialist countries." With the Soviet-dominated nations hostile to her. Communist China may have been searching for more dependable sources to take over the 18 per cent of her foreign trade which has gone to the Socialist bloc in recent years, and one of these sources may have been the U.S. However, in order to trade with the United States, Peking would have found it necessary to find some way to end Washington's trade embargo against her, perhaps through negotiations.
How did Washington policy makers respond to the Chinese proposal of November 26? Passively. Meanwhile, the new President spoke of entering "an era of negotiation" but he put emphasis on parleying with the Soviets. Nixon might have shown a more positive attitude, as nearly half of the U.S. defense budget is directed against a wide range of Chinese "threats."
Why did Peking cancel the talks? One superficial view is that changes in the Peking leadership resulted in the refusal. A more likely hypothesis is that the Chinese felt that if a defector was more important to the Americans than talking to China, then the U.S. must not have been too interested in negotiation anyway. There are several unknowns in this interpretation which may, in themselves, be answers. Was it only coincidence that Liao chose to defect barely a month before the Warsaw talks were to begin? Was it only chance that the clash with Soviet forces on the Ussuri River occurred searcely a week and a half after Peking had cancelled the negotiations, that is, only a short time after Moscow could be reasonably certain Sino-American relations would remain unimproved?
One State Department official has argued that it is a sad state of affairs when one country allows so slight an incident as the defection of a diplomat to another country to surpass in importance forthcoming negotiations with that country over consequential issues. Perhaps the Chinese side (again) saw the Liao incident as an undeserved insult which indicated continued U.S. unwillingness to negotiate seriously--to them, the "current anti-China atmosphere" (in the U.S. government) made it "obviously most unsuitable" to hold talks. The Chinese implied that once this "atmosphere" has dissipated, they would be willing to negotiate; but they must first know that the U.S. in ready to communicate its real intentions to them.
The devices Peking used to condemn the Liao incident shed light on the reasons for her cancellation. In the notes of February 4 and 19, the Chinese went out of their way to emphasize displeasure with Washington's treatment of the Liao affair rather than the mere fact that he had been granted diplomatic asylum. The first sentence of the February 4 note objected to the State Department's "brazenly" announcing the defection, while the second note said that the U.S.'s plotting "to send Liao Ho-shu to Taiwan with a view to creating further anti-China incidents" merits "particular" attention. The Chinese appeared to consider the U.S. handling of the incident unreasonable and indicative of how bad Sino-American relations would be in the next four years.
To inform Peking of a change in the U.S. stand so as to clear the "haze" out of the minds of the leaders there concerning U.S. intentions, the Nixon Administration must first convince them of U.S. sincerity. Since the Chinese cancelled the February 20 talks, the State Department has carried out some of the unilateral steps its spokesman said would have been raised had the talks been held that day. A more substantive approach would be to completely end the U.S. trade embargo against the Mainland.
But more important, the U.S. should assure Peking that it would not attack her fledgling nuclear arsenal and that it would use nuclear weapons against her only in self-defense; assurances followed by the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear warheads around her would be even more effective.
Conclusion
THE GENERAL ATTITUDE which underlies the old China Policy is that as long as the "irrational" Mao governs the Mainland, there can be no serious talks with his government. Peking feels the same way about the capitalist ruling class in America (whose nature, they say, can never change). But what the State Department China Policy makers overlook is that the most important factor in negotiation is the readiness of both sides to get down to business, and this readiness depends more on the political and security situation of the negotiating countries at a particular time than on who governs either country. For some reason, perhaps the tension on her border with the Soviets. Peking has indicated a desire to negotiate with flexibility so as to achieve peaceful coexistence with the United States. Instead of waiting until Mao dies, Washington should consider formulating some new, serious proposals on Taiwan (and the other matters mentioned above) to test the extent of Chinese willingness to patch up relations.
* These five principles are respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-agression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence