Introduction

THE GROWING WARMTH in Sino-American relations, as demonstrated by President Nixon's recent trip to China, has attracted great public interest. Several years ago, before the Nixon Administration had publicly indicated its desire for improved relations with the People's Republic of China, it appeared that the two countries would continue their heated confrontation. This paper--written in October 1969--provides some of the background for the surprising reconciliation and some of the motives of the two great powers involved.

President Nixon, in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1967, had expressed a desire to deal with China more forthrightly. In an interview published by the London Observer on November 24, 1968, Nixon restated that view. It may be fair to say, therefore, that president Nixon is most responsible for the initiation of improved relations with China--and not his National Security Affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger.

Important also is the fact that as early as November 26, 1968, the Chinese had clearly demonstrated that Taiwan and not the massive American presence in Vietnam was the main obstacle to better relations with Washington.

In the nearly three years between Peking's hints of a desire for improved relations and the Nixon trip, the U.S. eased its economic blockade and withdrew almost all of its fleet from the Taiwan Straits area. The Chinese were preoccupied with their strained relations with the Soviet Union and Japan. With the visit of the U.S. ping pong team to China and the interview of Chairman Mao by Edgar Snow which indicated that China would welcome a visit by Nixon, Sino-American relations began to blossom furiously.

What follows is a major portion of the author's paper written 30 months ago. A fully annotated copy of the entire paper is available at the Crimson.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AN ANALYSIS

RECENTLY, members of the Nixon Administration have shown interest in starting a dialogue with Mainland China. Whether or not their efforts will be fruitful may depend on several events between November 26, 1968, when Peking last proposed, to have informal, ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw, and February 19, 1969, when the Chinese cancelled these talks a day before they were to begin.

What were these events? What do they mean in light of each country's foreign and domestic problems? And how can the Nixon Administration apply the knowledge gained from these events to make its China Policy effective in ending current tensions with the Mainland? Clearly, there are no simple answers to these questions, but the following explanation outlines one approach which seems most relevant to the writer...

Summary Of Events

On November 26, 1968, a spokesman of the Information Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the United States of postponing the Warsaw talks scheduled for November 20, even though the Chinese had already offered to give "consideration" to having them February 20, 1969, at which time, "the new U.S. president (Mr. Nixon) will have been in office for a month and the U.S. side will probably be able to make up its mind." In his statement the spokesman went so far as to list two principles which were to be discussed on February 20. "First, the U.S. Government undertakes to immediately withdraw all its armed forces from China's territory Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits area and dismantle all its military installations in Taiwan Province; secondly, the U.S. Government agrees that China and the United States conclude an agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."

Also, the day before the Foreign Ministry Information spokesman delivered his statement, the Communist Chinese press republished Mao's ten-section "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China." The report, published for study and application by the masses, included two statements on timely subjects. One was on the maintenance of revolutionary discipline in the armed forces. The other dealt with peace talks. Mao wrote, "We should not refuse to enter into negotiations because we are afraid of trouble and want to avoid complications, nor should we enter into negotiations with our minds in a haze. We should be firm in principle: we should also have all the flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles."

On November 24, 1968, the London Observer published an interview with President-elect Nixon in which he discussed three points concerning U.S.-China Policy: (1) the U.S. must help the Southeast Asian countries achieve economic and military viability so as to become unattractive as targets for Chinese subversion: (2) after achieving this goal, conditions would be favorable for negotiations with China, so long as (3) Communist China recognizes that "military expansion will lead to world conflict, and world conflict is unthinkable" and diverts her energies to the solution of internal problems.

It should be pointed out that Nixon's statement was unofficial, while the Chinese Foreign Ministry statement reflected government policy.

Neither the U.S. nor China made any significant public mention of the ensuing negotiations for two months. The Mainland press did allot considerable space to worker and peasant denunciations of Nixon's inaugural address, but it did not refer to the talks until in late January, 1969, when the U.S. State Department announced the defection of Liao Ho-shu, a Chinese diplomat in the Netherlands. Then, on February 4, a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry Information Department in Peking said that both the removal of Liao Ho-shu to the U.S. and American hostility to China show that "U.S. President Nixon and his predecessor Johnson are jackals of the same lair without the least difference." The spokesman also threatened "grave consequences" should Liao not be handed back to China. On February 19, the spokesman announced Peking's cancellation of the Warsaw talks without setting a date for a future meeting.