There remained important differences in opinion, of course, even among those who signed. Some wanted the letter to be more strongly worded. Others argued that it should be shortened and toned down. The final letter was a compromise, for which no one student leader could claim authorship.

The letter's backers faced a temporary crisis shortly before releasing it in December when they realized that the number of signers had dropped to 85 as a result of withdrawals and miscounting. It took only a few quick calls, however, to restore the figure to 100 names. "The signatures were there," says one student leader. "The problem was not having any central organization."

To maximize the effectiveness of the letter, the students fed it exclusively to the New York Times, which played the story in column one--the second most important spot on the front page--and reprinted part of it. The text apparently appeared in the Times before it arrived at the White House, and caused a flurry of interest.

White House Concern

A top Presidential aide summoned one of the men who was believed to be an advisor to the students, and grilled him about their criticisms and plans. The White House, according to Administration officials, was concerned that the group might provide a rallying point for more broad-based expression of dissatisfaction.

Though the President has never answered the letter--and by all accounts has no intention of doing so--Secretary of State Dean Rusk replied on January 4, inviting the signers to Washington. Likening Communism in Vietnam to the Nazi threat in pre-war Europe, the Secretary wrote the students that there was not a "shadow of doubt" in his own mind about the involvement of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.

Although the Rusk letter, if anything, only alienated the students with its simplistic and worn-out arguments, the organizers of the letter were puzzled as to what tactic to try next.

They wanted to say something new and forceful; and yet, the tone of moderation and reasonableness was vital to their impact on the Administration and their widespread support among students. If they attempted to include more specific criticisms or options--on the bombing or negotiations, for example-they risked losing their coaltion. And, after all, they lacked the expertise to debate the Administration on military strategy.

Moreover, if they accepted Rusk's invitation, there was the possibility that the State Department might capitalize on disagreement within the group. Thus, when the State Department offered to televise a meeting between Rusk and eight of the students over NBC, the students refused.

They Accept The Invitation

The decision was made, however, in early January to arrange a private interview. The student leaders believed that they would be accused of being closed-minded if they declined; in any case, the visit would present an opportunity to draw national attention to their middle course.

In the next few weeks, the organizers worked again through long-distance conference calls, connecting 10 to 15 student leaders at a time from coast to coast, to arrange an acceptable date. Although the State Department insisted initially that the number of students be limited to 20, they agreed five days before the meeting to allow 45 to attend.

As the date of the meeting neared, the student leaders once again attempted to use the channels of the establishment to publicize their movement and mobilize support. Their plan called for a second letter to Johnson and a reply to Rusk, both to be given to the press Sunday for release Monday, barely 24 hours before the meeting.

The State Department learned of the plan on Thursday only by coincidence, when a reporter called officials to ask their reaction. One official commented that the Secretary would probably regard the move as "playing unfair," and that it "wouldn't go over very well." But he announced on Sunday, after talking to the student leaders over the weekend, that they had a "right to do anything they want." He had been assured, he said, that the letter would merely "continue the dialogue," and that the Secretary would receive a copy before it appeared in the press.

Their Plan Fizzles