'Criteria of Efficacy'

In rebutting Harris, Lowenstein focused on the criteria of efficacy: students, he said, could have a considerably impact on government policy; but they must appeal to the "broad middle" of the American public, accomplishing with large numbers what they might not be able to do with sheer intensity of feeling.

Although an act of conscience--such as burning a draft card--might be respected and admired by some, he said, it certainly could not be considered an effective tactic for changing public opinion. One such tactic, Lowenstein suggested, would be writing a letter to President Johnson, expressing misgivings about the war.

The Johnson letter idea appealed to many students in the audience and, as the debate continued, about 30 gathered in a corner of the Student Union to designate a drafting committee. Four members wrote separate letters, and a fifth student spliced them together--creating, as one put it, a "horrible hodgepodge."

The organizers of the letter, including Gregory B. Craig '67, chairman of the Harvard Undergraduate Council, circulated this letter at a meeting of about 100 students late the following evening. They compiled the names of about 80 students who said they would be willing to sign, and raised $83 to cover costs by passing a hat around. So far as can be determined, however, this draft of the letter was discarded almost immediately.

The real work of drafting began on Sept. 7 in New York City at the home of Abby Erdmann, a student at Smith College. In addition to 12 student body presidents, college newspaper editors, and several elder statesmen of NSA, the group included Norman Thomas, former Socialist candidate for President, who went to dinner with several students before the meeting convened at 8 p.m.

Norman Thomas' Role

Thomas stayed only briefly, but he played a crucial role, according to Miss Erdmann, in "helping us with the idea of the tone." He told the students, according to another participant, that he would die thinking his life spent for nothing, if, at that time, the U.S. were still in Vietnam.

Dividing into two groups--one to draft the letter and another to plan the mailings and cover material--the students worked until I am and met again several days later. At various times in September and early October members of the group suggested revisions and through this "process of evolution" the letter gradually emerged.

By mid-October the draft contained, for all practical purposes, the most important ideas and language of the final letter. It reported that "increasing numbers" of students were dissatisfied with the Administration's policy, and that for every militant dissenter there were many who were "deeply troubled."

The draft noted "contradictions" in official pronouncements, expressed doubt that American interests in Vietnam justified the country's growing commitment there, and repeated that the U.S. might soon find its most loyal and courageous young people choosing to go to jail rather than serve in the army.

No Election Gimmick

The students delayed mailing the letter--first because of the President's Asian trip, then the elections, and the President's subsequent illness. ("We didn't want it to look like an election gimmick," says Miss Erdmann.)

During November and December the tone of the letter was moderated slightly by stylistic changes--some made by long-distance phone calls to Athens, Greece, where one of the student leaders' advisors was traveling on business. But the substance of the letter, expressed in "questions" and "doubts," remained essentially the same.

The signers were recruited by long-distance conference calls, linking student leaders in various parts of the country with those in Boston and New York. Some of the original 80 refused to lend their names because they found even the modified tone too harsh; others said they could not pretend to represent the opinion of their campuses, though very few disagreed with the fundamental premise that discontent was spurading.