The undeniable aid that Congressional reform would have given civil rights legislation within the last few months has encouraged the notion that it could similarly assist other legislation.
However, two inescapable differences between the civil rights bill and most other measures expose the gap between the hopes and the actual potential for Congressional reform: (1) a majority in Congress will vote for scarcely any new legislative departure other than the civil rights bill and (2) non-legislative demands on Congressmen have lured legislators so far from lawmaking that reforms cannot retrieve them.
Senator Clark contended that only if the organization and procedure of the Senate corresponded to the ideological and geographical composition of the Democratic majority would the Senate be able to enact President Kennedy's programs. The Senator was correct that an unreformed Senate would obstruct the President, and this will be more true for President Johnson, who is openly advocating a program of social legislation. Reform will make little difference in the Senate's treatment of his program, however.
Rules vs. Votes
Reform would have helped civil rights simply by allowing it to come to a vote, but no one will filibuster against voting on Johnson's domestic and foreign affairs measures, even though many will vote against them. Once a bill is on the floor, there is very little anyone can do to prevent a Senator from offering any amendments he likes, regardless of how much they change the version approved in committee. Committee hearings and approval help, of course, but a determined majority on the floor can pass anything. The final issue is not rules but votes, and the present Congress does not have the votes to be but a little more liberal than it already is.
New rules would give liberal men more bargaining opportunities. The late Senator Robert Kerr (D-Okla.) used his committee positions with awesome effect. If he had died in early 1962 instead of early 1963, the Medicare bill would have passed the Senate in the summer of 1962. Northern liberals would require some time to develop the skills that others are well accustomed to wielding. Senator Russell Long (D-La.) reportedly explained to the little cabal of liberals filibustering against the communications satellite bill the same summer that he came "to help the Yankee boys out 'cause they wouldn't even know how to start without some outside help."
Even if changes in the rules gave new influence to men like Senator Clark, the ability to exploit this influence would suffer from the continuing growth of the Executive branch, from the growing demand by constituents that Congressmen act as their liaison with the Executive department, and from the increasing amounts of time and money that must be spent campaigning for re-election.