"Ha, ha, ha. And I might add: ho, ho, ho," observed Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois when recently asked his opinion on a proposed change in a procedural rule. The Republican Minority Leader's statement expresses concisely, if implicity, the two major reasons for the frustration of Congressional reform: (1) too many influential members, especially in the Senate, oppose basic reforms, and (2) there is a ludicrous discrepancy between the reformers' highest hopes and the remedial potential of their proposals.

For the Congressman whose power and prestige depend substantially upon certain rules of organization and procedure, and attempt to change these rules jeopardizes his personal position. The loss of a committee chairmanship would damage the ego and the influence of any legislator anywhere, but the extent of the damage depends largely upon the nature of the legislature. In a body with serious ideological splits and strict party discipline, little individual bargaining and compromising is possible. The voting strength of the various blocs within the full membership determines which bills can be passed. In the U.S. Congress, party discipline is almost unheard of.

Backstage Bargaining

Individual members argue means instead of parties arguing ends; disputes are usually handled by compromise rather than conflict. Only a rather narrow range of passable legislation enjoys a fairly large consensus. The provisions of a bill that can be passed depend as much upon negotiations in committee and off the record consultations as upon the division of votes in the full body. Many of the proposed reforms threaten to reduce the disproportionate influence which a few Congressmen exercise over this backstage bargaining.

The existence of an upper echelon within the Senate, and occasionally within the House, has long been a public secret in Washington. Everyone knows it exists, but the men who belong to the inner circle take only quiet pride in their membership. The men who hope eventually to work their way into this conclave know they hurt their own chances by talking about it. Senator Joseph Clark (D-Penn.), who is not a member, insured his continued ostracism by devoting three days on the floor last February to a description of what he called the "Senate Establishment" and to a list of fifteen reforms that would disestablish it.

After one year, only two minor items have been voted upon and approved. The unhappy history and uncertain future of the other reforms testify to fimn resistance from some quarter Whether the resistance originates with the Establishment described by Clark is uncertain. Opinions and pressure on a particular issue are especially difficult to trace when no major vote has been taken; and Clark's definition of the Establishment was ambiguous to begin with.

The Establishment

The Senator spoke of a bipartisan, conservative Establishment that had existed at least from the early years of this century. He also introduced a list of 21 current Senators comprising a "preferred group" by virtue of their committee assignments, but at least eight of the group could be called liberals. One definition agrees with those who have cited a "conservative coalition" or an "unholy alliance," the other with those who see an inner "club" based on seniority, ability, and personality, more than on politics. For Clark, the Establishment may consist, by definition, of the determined opponents of his proposals. This would resolve the ambiguity of his definition somewhat, since members of both the "conservative coalition" in the Senate and the "club" have reason to be wary of his proposals.

The Seniority System

Some of Clark's reforms are procedural, as are most of the many proposals suggested by other Senators within the last year. But his more important proposals and suggestions concern the selection and operation of committees. He does not recommend an end to the seniority system. He asks instead that it be used quite differently from the way it is now being used. At present, seniority determines a man's rank on a committee, but not the committees to which he is assigned. Southerners with long tenure receive chairmanships automatically, while the Democratic Steering Committee (which makes the assignments to the various committees) apparently rewards or punishes others according to their cooperation with the Establishment.

Clark argued that the seniority system should be applied rigorously to committee assignments but that committee chairman be selected by vote of the committee members. The Senator showed, during his three-day presentation, that six of seven veteran Democrats who received first-choice assignments to new committees had joined the Southerners in opposing a change of the filibuster rule earlier in the year. Of fourteen veteran Democrats who had opposed the Southerners, only one got his first-choice. The statistics were similar for second and third choices.

If the Southern members of the Establishment can turn the current rules this decisively to their advantage, their disapproval of any change is most understandable. This disapproval makes advocacy of changes in the rules difficult for more liberal Democrats in the Senate "club." They must cooperate in many ways with Southerners who command great influence. By crossing their nominal and powerful allies on such a crucial issue they would make life (and the passage of legislation) very difficult for themselves.

They also know, partly from the example the Southerners have set, that calculated departures from the seniority system are one of the few weapons they have to encourage party loyalty. Finally, they know that they, being more senior than most of their colleagues, will soon inherit choice committee chairmanships--if they can maintain patience with the present system! This argument would be likely to impress even Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), whose liberal reputation might well keep him from a voted committee chairmanship. If the present rules are maintained, however, he will receive a chairmanship that no one could contest, simply by virtue of his seniority.

The Filibuster

Regardless of the possibly unified opposition to Clark's proposals from the "conservative coalition" and Senate "club", these two groups disagree on Rule XXII, the filibuster rule. If last year's attempt to reduce the majority necessary for ending debate had succeeded, the imminent filibuster over the civil rights bill would not occur, and the strong provisions approved by the House would pass the Senate without significant amendment. If Senator Clark's reforms of the seniority and committee systems had been in effect, the Southerners could not have kept the civil rights bill from coming to a vote last year by deliberately, but quietly, slowing down the entire legislative process.

The undeniable aid that Congressional reform would have given civil rights legislation within the last few months has encouraged the notion that it could similarly assist other legislation.

However, two inescapable differences between the civil rights bill and most other measures expose the gap between the hopes and the actual potential for Congressional reform: (1) a majority in Congress will vote for scarcely any new legislative departure other than the civil rights bill and (2) non-legislative demands on Congressmen have lured legislators so far from lawmaking that reforms cannot retrieve them.

Senator Clark contended that only if the organization and procedure of the Senate corresponded to the ideological and geographical composition of the Democratic majority would the Senate be able to enact President Kennedy's programs. The Senator was correct that an unreformed Senate would obstruct the President, and this will be more true for President Johnson, who is openly advocating a program of social legislation. Reform will make little difference in the Senate's treatment of his program, however.

Rules vs. Votes

Reform would have helped civil rights simply by allowing it to come to a vote, but no one will filibuster against voting on Johnson's domestic and foreign affairs measures, even though many will vote against them. Once a bill is on the floor, there is very little anyone can do to prevent a Senator from offering any amendments he likes, regardless of how much they change the version approved in committee. Committee hearings and approval help, of course, but a determined majority on the floor can pass anything. The final issue is not rules but votes, and the present Congress does not have the votes to be but a little more liberal than it already is.

New rules would give liberal men more bargaining opportunities. The late Senator Robert Kerr (D-Okla.) used his committee positions with awesome effect. If he had died in early 1962 instead of early 1963, the Medicare bill would have passed the Senate in the summer of 1962. Northern liberals would require some time to develop the skills that others are well accustomed to wielding. Senator Russell Long (D-La.) reportedly explained to the little cabal of liberals filibustering against the communications satellite bill the same summer that he came "to help the Yankee boys out 'cause they wouldn't even know how to start without some outside help."

Even if changes in the rules gave new influence to men like Senator Clark, the ability to exploit this influence would suffer from the continuing growth of the Executive branch, from the growing demand by constituents that Congressmen act as their liaison with the Executive department, and from the increasing amounts of time and money that must be spent campaigning for re-election.