In the first contingency, it is clear that no program that is likely to be undertaken by the University would be of any benefit. In the second contingency, there are so many variable factors that it is impossible to determine what measures would be called for, and hence it seems impossible to "plan" for it. Therefore, the University should not take any extensive measures, nor devote substantial resources, to coping with either of these contingencies.

The third contingency--nuclear attack on targets at some distance from metropolitan Boston, or the accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon--presents quite a different situation. In such an event, there may well be substantial radioactive fallout in the Cambridge and Boston areas. If such fallout occurs, it would very likely be in such quantities as to be lethal or highly dangerous to unsheltered persons, but much less harmful--or even harmless--to persons who were in sheltered spaces with a protective factor of 100 or more.

Would Save Lives

If this third contingency prevailed, and if the fallout was not preceded or accompanied by local attacks causing blast and fires damaging fallout shelters and injuring their occupants, and there were no later attacks affecting the Boston area more directly, then fallout shelters would save the lives of all--or most--of their occupants.

The Committee is in no position to assess the relative probability of this 'fallout primarily' condition as compared with the other contingencies implying blast and fire effects, and we doubt whether anyone can reach reliable conclusions on this question. Within the Committee, there was a wide spectrum of opinion as to the probability that the third contingency would actually obtain in the event of war. Nevertheless, the Committee majority was agreed that the likelihood is sufficient to justify the University in taking the modest steps recommended to provide fallout shelters in its buildings.

Furthermore, any structure providing reasonable protection against fallout also has some degree of inherent protection against low intensities of blast or heat. Where inexpensive actions could increase resistance to such effects, the Committee believes they should be taken, especially where they affect the continuued integrity of the fallout shelters themselves.

The Committee recognizes that the division of public opinion about civil defense means that Harvard's decision about