(Following are excerpts from the ten-page preliminary report to President Pusey by the Harvard Civil Defense Study Committee. Separate views of two members--David Cavers, Fessenden Professor of Law, and Arthur D. Troddenberg, as-assistant dean of the Faculty--will be printed later this week.)

At the request of President Pusey, the Committee has considered the wide range of possible actions which the University might take . . . to cope with physical injury or damage from blast, fire, and radioactive fallout in the event of nuclear war . . . . The Committee has considered four major aspects of the problem:

* the basic policy issue of the place of civil defense in national defense activities;

* the various policies which the University might adopt in respect to civil defense;

* the relationships of Harvard to the people of the surrounding communities and their governments, in respect to civil defense;

* the technical problems presented by any civil defense activity by Harvard, should such activity be authorized.

(Among the general recommendations of the Committee were the following:)

(1) Harvard should undertake the first steps of a modest civil defense program, aimed primarily at protecting persons against the effects of radioactive fallout.

(2) The initial action should be one of careful planning for a fallout shelter program, the coordination of existing resources of utility in an emergency, identification of those items which have a long "lead time," development of University policies for its comportment in possible periods of international tension short of actual war, and related activities.

(3) Harvard should cooperate with the Federal program of identification, marking and stocking of existing shelter space, but should not be committeed in advance to any future steps, or to any assumptions or limitations in the Federal fallout shelter program.

(4) Shelter spaces in Harvard facilities, up to the limit of shelter capacity, should be available to all without regard of Harvard affiliation.

(5) Harvard should proceed with the planning and execution on its own moderate, long-term civil defense program, without being governed by the possible fluctuations of any Federal or local civil defense program.

Reasons for Recommendations

The Committee presents these recommendations on the basis of extended discussion, the reading of position papers prepared by various members of the Committee, as well as by consideration of the attitudes of persons outside the Committee, and the best information which could be obtained as to the emerging outlines of the new Federal civil defense programs. However, the Committee did not seek out the views or opinions of the Harvard Faculty or student body. . . .

The Committee defined five policy positions which Harvard might take concerning its own civil defense activity:

* To reject any civil defense action whatever, and to refuse to cooperate with any Federal or local civil defense program;

* To passively cooperate with any civil defense program which might develop, but to take no positive action or initiative;

* To make plans for a fallout shelter program, but to take no further action at this time;

* To determine Harvard's needs and capacities, and to go ahead now on a University program which would be coordinated with any Federal or local plans or programs which may develop;

* To press ahead with an "all-out" unilateral civil defense program, regardless of what may develop as national or local civil defense policy.

Questions to Be Answered

In arriving at a decision on this basic question, there are several relevant considerations:

-- What are the effects of nuclear attack, and are there any conditions in which civil defense activities by the University would be effective? If the answer to this question is "no," then all other questions are irrelevant.

-- Even if the conclusion is "yes," should the University take any action which would imply approval of the national civil defense policy, or of the Federal civil defense program as presently defined?

-- What is the University's responsibility to its students and staff?

-- What responsibilities or relationships does Harvard have with the communities within which it is situated?

The Committee considered the range of effects of nuclear weapons, and it concluded that the following conditions (among others) might occur in event of nuclear war:

* an attack with large nuclear weapons which hit Metropolitan Boston, either by design or as an alternative to other targets;

* An attack which hits peripheral targets in the Metropolitan Boston area, either by design or accident;

* an attack directed at major military targets (of which the most likely in this area is Westover Field, near Springfield), and upon other urban areas.

In the first contingency, it is clear that no program that is likely to be undertaken by the University would be of any benefit. In the second contingency, there are so many variable factors that it is impossible to determine what measures would be called for, and hence it seems impossible to "plan" for it. Therefore, the University should not take any extensive measures, nor devote substantial resources, to coping with either of these contingencies.

The third contingency--nuclear attack on targets at some distance from metropolitan Boston, or the accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon--presents quite a different situation. In such an event, there may well be substantial radioactive fallout in the Cambridge and Boston areas. If such fallout occurs, it would very likely be in such quantities as to be lethal or highly dangerous to unsheltered persons, but much less harmful--or even harmless--to persons who were in sheltered spaces with a protective factor of 100 or more.

Would Save Lives

If this third contingency prevailed, and if the fallout was not preceded or accompanied by local attacks causing blast and fires damaging fallout shelters and injuring their occupants, and there were no later attacks affecting the Boston area more directly, then fallout shelters would save the lives of all--or most--of their occupants.

The Committee is in no position to assess the relative probability of this 'fallout primarily' condition as compared with the other contingencies implying blast and fire effects, and we doubt whether anyone can reach reliable conclusions on this question. Within the Committee, there was a wide spectrum of opinion as to the probability that the third contingency would actually obtain in the event of war. Nevertheless, the Committee majority was agreed that the likelihood is sufficient to justify the University in taking the modest steps recommended to provide fallout shelters in its buildings.

Furthermore, any structure providing reasonable protection against fallout also has some degree of inherent protection against low intensities of blast or heat. Where inexpensive actions could increase resistance to such effects, the Committee believes they should be taken, especially where they affect the continuued integrity of the fallout shelters themselves.

The Committee recognizes that the division of public opinion about civil defense means that Harvard's decision about