The arbiter will be dragged into a "political bickering." Dissolution might be of little help to him if the electorate sends the same men back to Parliament.

In a country where history often repeats itself because its citizens react, like Pavlov's dogs, to bells rung by historical parallels, the Presidency of the Fifth Republic might well travel the same road as the Presidency of the Third.

After a period of fights between the President and Parliament, the former consented to fade away, without ever using again most of his extensive powers. The final victory of Parliament, the only thoroughly representative organ elected by universal suffrage, is more likely than autocracy to come out of this Constitution. We would be back almost where we began.

The evolution of France, however, will not be determined merely by the new document. As de Gaulle puts it, "The rest will depend on men."

Constitutional reform is not a panacea, but a prerequisite; and if the new bottle receives only old wine, one of the last French illusions--faith in the unlimited possibilities of constitutional engineering--will be shattered.

The lack of a potential governing majority remains the crucial political problem. Without such a majority, cabinets will remain fragile, deprived of a firm basis in the electorate and more likely to find enemies than friends in Parliament. The wide gap between the political system, operating in an intellectual vacuum and an apathetic country has been one of the causes of the down-fall of the Fourth Republic. The present Constitution, by itself, does nothing to close this gap, except in so far as it provides for the possibility of occasional referendums.

One of the advantages of a Presidential system would have been to establish a direct link between the electorate and the Executive, but the dangers seemed too great, precisely because there is no coherent majority among the voters.

It is impossible to see how such a majority could be created in the near future. The men who ruled the Fourth Republic are likely to occupy the new structure too. They give little evidence of having reformed since last May. The party system is just as decrepit. New scissions have been added to the old splits. The only certainly that emerges from much talk about realignments is the appearance of new splinter groups.

In the battle for and against the Constitution, confusion could hardly have been greater. Most of the men who overthrew the Fourth Republic advocated positive vote; they declared that it would show France's determination to keep Algeria French. However, Algeria is nowhere mentioned in the text, and General de Gaulle just said that the Moslems are Moslem--a rare example of politically meaningful tautology.

Many Leftists Voted Yes

Left-wing Gaullists and many Socialists also voted yes, but they reject Algerian integration and ask for a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless many of those (like Pierre Mendes-France) who have pressed for such a settlement have insisted on voting no, in order to protest against the coup d' Alger of May 13 and against the spirit of the Constitution, which they consider insufficiently democratic. They remain faithful to the old Republican tradition which associates democracy only with a sovereign Parliament.

The political scientist Duverger explained that the greater number of noes, the more de Gaulle would be helped in his allegedly liberal designs on Algeria (de Gualle, however, asked for a massive yes).

On the contrary, the Radical party, which has put at its head the next-to-last Premier of the Fourth Republic, Felix Gaillard (not exactly a symbol of renovation), has remained faithful to its own tradition of tolerant ambiguity by deciding to vote yes by a bare majority, with the intention nevertheless of disapproving most of what has been done since May! The Communists, of course, are uncompromisingly hostile to de Gaulle.

The referendum should give de Gaulle the popular legitimacy he needs and wants. The subsequent course of the new state will depend on two things: Algeria and the November elections. Whether de Gaulle will invest his authority in an attempt at putting a rapid end to the Algerian conflict remains to be seen, for the margin of action is so small that the referendum is not likely to make a big difference.

Realistic Attitude on Algeria