Sunday's results--strong approval by the French of their latest constitution--open a new episode in France's political development. It is as yet too early to analyze the meaning of the voting pattern; below, Mr. Hoffman, Henry LaBarre Jayne Assistant Professor of Government, discusses the principles, provisions and prospects of the Charter on which the Fifth French Republic will be based.

For more than twelve years, as head of the ill-fated French People's Rally, and in his memoirs, General de Gaulle has made the institution of the Third and Fourth Republics responsible for France's political troubles. According to him, these institutions expressed all too faithfully the many divisions of French thought and interests. Hence the impotence of the Executive, which depended for survival on heterogenous, unstable coalitions, and which could do no more, on crucial issues such as Indochina, German rearmament or Algeria, than accumulate postponements until external events imposed their own solutions.

Strong State to Combat Strife

DeGaulle has always proposed as a remedy the establishment of a strong state, which will make the government of France possible in spite of party conflicts and intra-party splits but which will nevertheless continue to owe its authority to popular consent.

Two assumptions co-exist, rather awkwardly, in the General's mind. There is first an optimistic postulate according to which the French nation, underneath all its divisions, still possesses a dormant general will which could be aroused by a dynamic and stable government. There is also the pessimistic idea that the divisions of the electorate are here to stay, that no constitutional trickery could erase them, and consequently that the Executive will be strong only if it is removed from intimate contact with an electorate and a Parliament which remain unable to produce a coherent majority.

Numerous examples could be used to show that both assumptions are indeed correct. Nevertheless, their theoretical implications are mutually exclusive. To reconcile them is a difficult as the squaring of the circle; however, this is exactly what the new constitution tries to do.

Parliamentary Government Retained

On the one hand, paliamentary government will continue. Governments will again require parliamentary support for their establishment and their survival, as the difference of American cabinets. The idea of having France's chief executive elected by universal suffrage has not been adopted, partly because of plebiscitarian memories, partly because of the fundamental nature of France's divisions. Except if he resorted to dictatorial manipulations, a popularly elected French president would be likely to represent no more than a small fraction of the electorate, and his authority would be open to constant challenge. A presidential system works effectively only if the great bulk of the electorate accepts the "rules of the game." This is not the case of modern France.

Executive Made More Powerful

On the other hand, however, two sets of drastic measures are introduced in order to provide the Executive with power and prestige. First, Parliament's capacity to cripple the government is reduced. This is what de Gaulle means when he speaks of "a government and a Parliament that work together but remain separate as to their responsibilities."

Parliament's sessions will be shorter. The power of parliamentary committees is curtailed. Cabinets can be overthrown only if a motion of no confidence is carried by an absolute majority of the National Assembly's members; if such a motion fails its authors cannot try again for one year. Also, deputies will be less tempted to destroy a cabinet in order to become ministers in the next one; from now on deputies who enter a cabinet have to resign from their seats.

Secondly, there is la grande pensee of General de Gaulle. Precisely because the citizens and their representatives remain divided, and because the cabinets will in the final analysis continue to depend on Parliament, there must be above all the other institutions of the state "a national arbiter far removed from political bickering."

Similarly, three hundred years ago, Richelieu had warned his King that only a monarchical strait-jacket could keep together a fickle and undisciplined nation. In de Gaulle's constitution, the President of the Republic, elected by a College of about 75,000 citizens (including Parliament and delegates of France's territorial subdivisions), will ensure "the regular operation of France's institutions" and guarantee "the continuity of the State."

He is not supposed to be a policy-maker, a guide, a Legislator a la Rousseau, but a constitutional and national conscience: the man who sees to it that the political community of France survives in spite of all the accidents of history. His power of arbitration consists mainly of two weapons: the right to dissolve the National Assembly, and the right to take almost unlimited emergency measures in case of extreme danger to the state.

There is another reason for the creation of a strong Presidency. The President of the Republic will be the head of the "Community." This is the name given to the Federal Commonwealth which will be established between the French Republic and its present overseas territories (among which Algeria is not included since it is legally a set of departments incorporated into the Republic).

Provisions for Community Flexible

The provisions which deal with the Community are generous, imaginative and flexible. Any overseas territory which rejects the Constitution becomes independent, althought it can still later on sign an agreement of association with France. Any territory which chooses to remain within the Community can become a member state, and it can always pull out later.

Federal institutions are created: the President of the Republic, a Senate composed of delegates of the Republic's Parliament and of the member states' legislatures, and a Court of Arbitration.

Althought the Constitution enumerates the areas over which these federal institutions have jurisdiction, implementation is left to future agreements between France and the other members.

Will de Gaulle's Constitution, the twelfth since 1789 by my count, succeed in giving to the Fifth Republic a longer and better life than the four previous ones enjoyed?

No Danger to Democracy

The new document does not endanger democracy in France. De Gaulle himself, who is likely to be the first President of the new Republic, is neither a demagogue nor an autocrat. The institution of the Republic, in spite of what many critics of the Constitution declare, can hardly serve as a springboard for dictatorship. The emergency powers are described so minutely that they cannot really be used except in situations such as the fall of the Third Republic in June, 1940, or like the fall of the Fourth last May--circumstances in which a "national arbiter" might prove indispensable.

The control of the civil service and of the armed forces, as well as the definition of policy, remain the attributes of the cabinet. The Premier is selected by the President, but this was already the case under the last two Republics, and the Premier cannot operate without Parliament's support.

Public liberties and the free competition of parties are guaranteed by the Constitution.

Indeed, the only justified misgivings lie in the opposite direction. De Gaulle's Constitution, rather than achieving a perhaps impossible synthesis between the General's two assumptions, merely juxtaposes them. La Fontaine's fable of the pot of iron and the pot of clay comes to the mind: the possibilities of division and dispersion remain greater than the chances of unity and "arbitration." The two series of innovations designed to strengthen the Executive look more impressive than they are.

Parliament Could By-pass Barriers

First, with regard to the relations between Parliament and the government, many of the barriers erected in order to contain the former can probably be by-passed. Comparable devices introduced by the Constitution of 1946 have proved useless. To be sure, they were much less daring, but they had appeared very impressive in 1946. Unruly parties find all too easily ways of overthrowing cabinets without resorting to the difficult procedure of motions of no confidence.

The Constitution creates a "Constitutional Council" whose task will consist of reviewing the constitutionality of laws and of Parliament's standing orders. But this Council will not be a very big obstacle to a reassertion of Parliament's supremacy, if such a reassertion takes the form of unwritten customs and trusts, as it did in the past.

Secondly, the austere and decisive Presidency of the Republic is more a theoretician's dream than a practical remedy. Should the "national arbiter" refuse to accept the resignation of a cabinet whenever the Premier has not been overthrown by a motion of no confidence, even though Parliament has made the Premier's life impossible, or should the President dissolve the Assembly whenever it has paralyzed the government, then a move which the President might interpret as a pure act of arbitration "designed to insure the normal functioning of the institutions" will inevitably become a hot political issue.

Disolution of Dubious Value

The arbiter will be dragged into a "political bickering." Dissolution might be of little help to him if the electorate sends the same men back to Parliament.

In a country where history often repeats itself because its citizens react, like Pavlov's dogs, to bells rung by historical parallels, the Presidency of the Fifth Republic might well travel the same road as the Presidency of the Third.

After a period of fights between the President and Parliament, the former consented to fade away, without ever using again most of his extensive powers. The final victory of Parliament, the only thoroughly representative organ elected by universal suffrage, is more likely than autocracy to come out of this Constitution. We would be back almost where we began.

The evolution of France, however, will not be determined merely by the new document. As de Gaulle puts it, "The rest will depend on men."

Constitutional reform is not a panacea, but a prerequisite; and if the new bottle receives only old wine, one of the last French illusions--faith in the unlimited possibilities of constitutional engineering--will be shattered.

The lack of a potential governing majority remains the crucial political problem. Without such a majority, cabinets will remain fragile, deprived of a firm basis in the electorate and more likely to find enemies than friends in Parliament. The wide gap between the political system, operating in an intellectual vacuum and an apathetic country has been one of the causes of the down-fall of the Fourth Republic. The present Constitution, by itself, does nothing to close this gap, except in so far as it provides for the possibility of occasional referendums.

One of the advantages of a Presidential system would have been to establish a direct link between the electorate and the Executive, but the dangers seemed too great, precisely because there is no coherent majority among the voters.

It is impossible to see how such a majority could be created in the near future. The men who ruled the Fourth Republic are likely to occupy the new structure too. They give little evidence of having reformed since last May. The party system is just as decrepit. New scissions have been added to the old splits. The only certainly that emerges from much talk about realignments is the appearance of new splinter groups.

In the battle for and against the Constitution, confusion could hardly have been greater. Most of the men who overthrew the Fourth Republic advocated positive vote; they declared that it would show France's determination to keep Algeria French. However, Algeria is nowhere mentioned in the text, and General de Gaulle just said that the Moslems are Moslem--a rare example of politically meaningful tautology.

Many Leftists Voted Yes

Left-wing Gaullists and many Socialists also voted yes, but they reject Algerian integration and ask for a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless many of those (like Pierre Mendes-France) who have pressed for such a settlement have insisted on voting no, in order to protest against the coup d' Alger of May 13 and against the spirit of the Constitution, which they consider insufficiently democratic. They remain faithful to the old Republican tradition which associates democracy only with a sovereign Parliament.

The political scientist Duverger explained that the greater number of noes, the more de Gaulle would be helped in his allegedly liberal designs on Algeria (de Gualle, however, asked for a massive yes).

On the contrary, the Radical party, which has put at its head the next-to-last Premier of the Fourth Republic, Felix Gaillard (not exactly a symbol of renovation), has remained faithful to its own tradition of tolerant ambiguity by deciding to vote yes by a bare majority, with the intention nevertheless of disapproving most of what has been done since May! The Communists, of course, are uncompromisingly hostile to de Gaulle.

The referendum should give de Gaulle the popular legitimacy he needs and wants. The subsequent course of the new state will depend on two things: Algeria and the November elections. Whether de Gaulle will invest his authority in an attempt at putting a rapid end to the Algerian conflict remains to be seen, for the margin of action is so small that the referendum is not likely to make a big difference.

Realistic Attitude on Algeria

De Gaulle is supposed to reject both integration and independence for Algeria; and as long as the Algerian Liberation Front insists that negotiations must lead to France's acceptance of independence, to reject the latter means to reject the former. De Gaulle's predecessors have had the same attitude. It is a realistic one given the state of mind of Frenchmen in Algeria (both civilian and military) as well as of Frenchmen in France (where very few of the Liberals have come out for independence; on the whole they ask for negotiations, thus forgetting a bit too easily what the Liberation Front's terms are).

But this is a brand of realism which is not likely to bring the war to a rapid close. Meanwhile, France's internal system and international position continue to hinge on the Algerian tragedy.

As for the coming elections, they will probably lead to paradoxical results. The electorate is, in all likelihood, much better disposed toward de Gualle than toward the various parties, with their small membership and low vitality. The voters will have no other choice, however, than to re-elect most of the old party war horses.

DeGaulle Resigned in 1945

Even if parties favorable to de Gaulle get a clear majority, one should remember that a Gaullist majority had also been elected in October, 1945, and that three months later de Gaulle resigned in disgust. This time, to be sure, he is likely to be entrenched in the Presidency of the Republic (or should I say imprisoned?).

Changes between the last Parliment of the Fourth Republic and the first Parliament of the Fifth are likely to result from the new electoral system as much as from possible shifts in the population's votes. What the system will be is still unknown; it is de Gaulle's present cabinet which will be is still unknown; it is de Gaulle's present cabinet which will determine it, and each party is busy advocating the electoral law which is most likely to increase its representation in the next Assembly.

Law May Hurt Communists

One of the purposes of the new law will probably be to reduce the representation of the Communist Party in the National Assembly, so as to make the life of center parties, and of cabinets who depend on them, less uncomfortable. The real problem here, however, remains the size of the Communist vote in the country. Only persistent governmental action in such fields as education, housing, and social legislation has a chance of reducing this vote in the long run.

Whether the new Constitution succeeds or not, it constitutes a temperate effort toward political stability and a bold experiment in "de-colonization." It thus reflects quite well some of the main features of de Gaulle's leadership.

It was a mistake to see in his place for a strong state an echo of Fascism; he has shown himself aware and respectful of France's tradition of freedom, to such an extent that his attempt to establish as much of a powerful Executive as this tradition tolerates might well prove insufficient.

Believes Strongly in French

It wast also a mistake to see in his plea for la grandeur an appeal to old fashioned nationalism. It merely reflects de Gaulle's conviction that the French will not be satisfied with a diminutive role in world affairs, that they are politically at their best only when they believe that they can still do great things together, and that they will not be able to play an important role if they do not face the world of 1958 on its own terms.

De Gaulle warns against a pure and simple regression into the limits and problems of metropolitan France; nothing could be more dangerous than the after-effects of such an amputation of France's historical image of herself.

Nor does the General offer grandilo-quent policy of splendid isolation and shrill pretensions; the modern world requires cooperation between France and her European neighbors on the one hand, and France and the underdeveloped countries of her former Empire on the other.

The big question of France's future is whether de Gaulle's appeal to a modern greatness will turn out to have been realistic or utopian. Only the French can provide the answer.

Challenges People

De Gaulle's own greatness lies in his repeated challenge to them to prove their worth. The novelist and polemecist, Francois Mauriac, has well understood the nature of de Gaulle's present effort when he interpreted the General to mean: "When I will no longer be there, I will continue to serve you through the institutions I have given you, and I will protect you, as I have always wanted to, from the misfortunes you bring upon yourselves. For what is true of individuals is also true of nations: their character is their destiny."