The reports that flowed into Smithsonian headquarters in the first few days therefore did not give exact enough satellite locations to make calculation of an orbit possible. Punched cards were fed into the type 704 computers at MIT, lights flashed and dials lit up, but the machines were not satisfied and haughtily "rejected" the information.
Operations at the Smithsonian office settled into the daily pattern of frenetic activity that they have followed ever since. The direct teletype line to the Naval Research Laboratory clattered out constant messages back and forth. A special section under Leon Campbell maintained contact with the various Moon-watch teams, receiving their reports, providing them with information, and answering their requests. There was continuous work in the examination and evaluation of reported sightings.
Perhaps one of the least conspicuous burdens was and is being carried on by the public information section, under the direction of John White. Ever since the evening of October 4, the Smithsonian and photographers, and the telephone wires have been jammed by requests for office has been filled with newspapermen information by the general public.
The Observatory was clearly understaffed for the work it had been called upon to do. But it was a government project, and in government offices authorizations for hiring additional personnel come slowly. A few days later, desperate and sleepless, White issued an appeal for volunteer aid from University students.
Once Sputnik began to be visible above the United States, the Moonwatch teams again became active, and now that radio contact with the first satellite has been lost, their daily reports provide the only information on the wanderings of Sputnik I and its fellow-travelling rocket.
Special Tracking Cameras
The Observatory is also advancing its work in setting up special tracking cameras for satellite observation. The one that has already been manufactured, though it was disassembled in early October, is now in operation at Pasadena, Calif. The others, it is hoped, will be ready by the beginning of next year. They will be located at Curacao, West Indies; Arequipa, Peru; Villa Dolores, Argentina; Maui, Hawaii; Tokyo, Japan; Woomera, Australia; Naini-tad, India; Shiraz, Iran; Cadiz, Spain, and Johannesburg, South Africa.
Whipple and Hynek express complete satisfaction with their observation system to date. Moonwatch teams were at an initial disadvantage in that they were located in positions from which the projected American satellite would be visible early in its life, but which were out of the range of visibility for the Russian satellite for about a week after its launching.
Their reports have now become much more accurate, and the programming techniques for the MIT computers have been perfected, so that satellite orbits are now easily calculable and the position of the first satellite, at least, can be exactly predicted for any one moment.
Whipple looks upon this past month mainly as an extremely valuable warmup period for his own organization. Experience in dealing with the Russian satellites have ironed out most of the wrinkles in the U.S. observation system that might have delayed Smithsonian operations had the American satellite been the first to take to the air.
The U.S. network of observation posts, Smithsonian officials also point out, is much more extensive than the Russian system. The Soviets have even expressed a desire to purchase some American photographic tracking equipment and have modeled their Moonwatch telescopes closely after the U.S. prototype. The implication is that once the U.S. gets a satellite up, it will be in a better position to gain scientific information from it than the Soviets are with theirs.
This is the only problem remaining--to get a U.S. satellite launched--and for that the Smithsonian, it is thankful, has no responsibility