But even so, mistakes happen. Bauer, explaining in a lecture that the Russian youth's mind was sharp but lacking in access to information, compared it to a water pump filled with air, which cries for water. The next day's headlines however, read, "Says Mind of Soviet Youth Like Vacuum."

For the study itself, 15, to 20 men interviewed refugees, trying to get the men's life history, combined with their political and social attitudes and their reactions toward the regime. The Center interviewed over 600 people and used a mnemonic phrase as a guide to get experiences and attitudes in a certain area: "We Guarantee Free Expression Concerning Soviet Problems." The W stands for Work experience, the G for Government, F for Family, E for Education, S for Statification, while the P stands for Philosophy of life.

"There was really no outstanding problem in getting the Russians to talk," Bauer recalls, "We had difficulties because the people were in a delicate position and were afraid both of prejudicing there chances or getting into the United States, and they were also wary of Soviet agents. We were quite successful, although many came in suspicious."

"But," as Inkeles adds, "Bauer's team broke through the suspicion with its sincerity and convinced the people that this was a scientific scholarly work and that we weren't the NVKD or FBI." The refugees, both Bauer and Inkeles agreed, wanted to talk to someone they trusted. "Once they became convinced of our scholarly purpose they became enthusiastic." In fact, as Inkeles points out, the problem then became stopping them. "The Russians are big talkers, very voluble, and they like to reminisce. We tried to hold interviews down to 12 hours, two hours in the morning, two in the afternoon for three days," Bauer added. The Center granted all refugees complete anonymity, and no names were kept.

The interviewing for the study has been completed, and the project officially ends next year. But the vast files in the Center attest to the work still left. The questionnaire material has been transferred to IBM cards, while a cross file with 100 major divisions contains the research data. More than 600 people were interviewed, while over 2,800 people filled out 11,000 different questionnaires.

Everyday Life

The main purpose of the project, according to Inkeles, is understanding Soviet institutions and capabilities. "We didn't have the feeling of everyday life before, and we may never get inside the Politburo. What we want to know is what it means for the ordinary citizen to live in Russia.

"Joseph Berliner's report on the Soviet factory, for instance, exposes problems of the factory which the Russians had wanted to keep secret and which might hurt them if the opportunity arose."

As the Senators found, the practical value of such a program could seem quits intangible until one is in a position to apply research material into psychological warfare or economic planning., "People must realize the problem in translation between basic research and operational research," Bauer says. "We're getting at the basic principles for psychological warfare, not writing radio scripts. We're trying to find where the Russians can be shaken and where they can't be shaken."

Among the refugees there is only hatred for the convinced Communist. Most refugees felt that the convinced Party man will have to be dealt with drastically in the event that the regime is overthrown. According to one man interviewed, "The MVD will be torn to pieces by the population, no Army could every protect them."

"Cruel" and "Bloody"

Stalin was seen as the force behind the existence of the police and the party, and he was held directly responsible for their activities. Most common description of Stalin by the refugees included the words, "cruel," "stubborn," "bloody," "merciless." The refugees felt that his motto was "Go forward without changes, even if people are hungry, even if millions die."

Considering the intensity of their reaction to the Soviet system and the widespread dissatisfaction which the refugees report, one would expect the escapees from Russia to play up the instability of the regime. It is quite striking therefore, according to Bauer and Inkeles, that the informants were almost unanimous in agreeing that there are virtually no chances for an internal revolution or any other form of marked change in the Soviet system brought about spontaneously from within the country. Only by application of force from the outside, the refugees insist, will it be possible to overthrow the present regime.