A Western diplomat declared last week in Washington that it was of the utmost importance for observers of the current international situation to study two danger spots in the world--Korea and Germany--side by side. Korea is on the eastern rim of the Communist land mass; Germany on the western. It is inconceivable, he said, that events in the two places are unrelated.

This week the CRIMSON questioned four professors on the problems confronting the United States and the United Nations in the Far East, and in Europe. These men were: Edwin O. Reischauer, professor of Far Eastern Languages; Benjamin Schwartz, assistant professor of History and author of the recently-published "Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao;" Carl J. Friedrich, professor of Government, who has just returned from a long trip to Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria; and William Y. Elliott, Leroy B. Williams Professor of History and Political Sciences.

The two Far East experts, Reischauer and Schwartz, expressed somewhat conservative hopes for a truce settlement in Korea in the near future. The European experts, Friedrich and Elliott stressed the necessity of continuing our policy of rearmament and Russian containment on an undiminished, if not accelerated, scale.

Reischauer Changes Views

Reischauer, who stated that he thought there was a 50-50 chance for success in the Korean truce talks, has become reconciled to a peace which would involve a split Korea. A split would be "unfortunate," he feels, "but probably the best thing available." He admits that his point of view has changed since last fall, when, before Chinese Communist intervention in the war, he stated that "a divided country is an intolerable situation for all Koreans... victory would be meaningless to the South Koreans unless we gave them unification."

Schwartz, who has a "feeling that China really wants a truce" is also resigned to a divided Korea as the best peace arrangement possible at this time.

If the truce talks fail, Reischauer thinks the U.N. would be justified in studying the feasibility of the MacArthur proposals for 1) use of Nationalist troops in Korea; 2) blockade of the Chinese mainland; 3) bombing of Manchurian and Chinese bases; 4) invasion of the Chinese mainland.

Best of the Four

Of the four proposals, Reischauer considers a full blockade of the Chinese coast the best with which to start. The others do not seem nearly so advisable to him, particularly the one advocating a landing in China. He pointed out also that "there might not be enough Chinese troops in Formosa to make the use of the Nationalists in Korea worthwhile."

Schwartz feels that the MacArthur projects would involve us in a full-scale war, in China--"just what the Russians want." Only if the tempo of the air war steps up in Korea and the Chinese Communists start using a great many more planes would we be justified in bombing Manchuria, he said.

Schwartz stated that he thought the U.N. already had a "pretty tight" blockade of China, but that if the talks failed "it might move further in that direction."

Both men felt it "highly improbable" that Russia herself would actively intervene in the Korean conflict. Reischauer thought it possible, however, that the Soviet might contribute some kind of "half-way help--perhaps so-called 'volunteer units.'"

Infinite Patience Needed

The two men expressed satisfaction with the recently-signed Japanese peace treaty, although both felt that it contained certain minor imperfections. Schwartz found it regrettable that the treaty makers did not consult with India, even if not necessarily agreeing with her. He stated that the United States should adopt a policy of "infinite patiency" toward that country.

"We must not read too much into the behaviour of the Asian countries in signing the treaty," he warned. "Their behaviour does not always express the opinion of the articulate classes. Indonesia, for instance, may have trouble ratifying the treaty at home.