However, it will not always be possible or desirable to reassert all the 1933 boundaries, especially where they may have been set aside by subsequent votes of self-determination or where they may have become clearly impracticable. Thus, Germany should keep the Saar Territory which it recovered in 1935 by a free and fair plebiscite and with the blessing of the League of Nations. Russia will keep the "Russian" territories noted above which she occupied in 1939-40, some of which were clearly too small and weak for an independent existence and voted (under pressure, to be sure) to become part of the Soviet Union.

To let Stalin keep these territories would seem to be inconsistent with the principle of "boundaries as in 1933." But one has to be realistic; they are in his possession.

Furthermore, unlike Hitler and Mussolini who started a disturbance of the peace of Europe by aggressively and forcibly seizing other peoples' territories, Stalin acted only after a general European war had been started by others, and then only took such territories as had formerly been part of tsarist Russia and which he felt were necessary for Russia's self-defense in the face of Hitler's sweeping victories. The sooner the Poles and the Baltic populations reconcile themselves to these stern realities, however cruel for themselves, the better.

Danube Mixup

The complicated boundary questions in the Danubian and Balkan areas cannot be discussed in this article. It may be added that in urging that the principle of "The boundaries of 1933 as far as possible" be recognized at or prior to the armistice period, one does not necessarily preclude the possibility of later boundary modifications which conditions may make it desirable for the United Nations or for a new international body to agree upon.

In accordance--with this 1933 principle, Germany would lose all the territorial acquisitions made by Hitler except the Saar. Alsace-Lorraine would go back to France; Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium; the Corridor and the other annexed Polish territories of Poland. Austria would be separate and independent until a pledbiscite or an agreement should decide whether it should be reunited with Germany, remain independent, or find a new existence in some kind of a Danubian federation or new arrangement. The Sudeten Germans would remain with the Czechs within the natural mountain frontier of Czechoslovakia as in 1933, except such Sudeten Germans as preferred to migrate to the Reich.

Post-War Germany

What will happen in Germany, as the war drawn to a close? Will there be a revolt of the army or its officers against the Nazi Party? Or a civilian uprising in Germany? Probably not. Communism? Possibly sporadic efforts to establish it. More likely, however, there will be more or less chaotic conditions after the Nazi totalitarian machine has ben destroyed and its leaders have been assassinated, or taken to flight or hiding, or handed over to be punished as war criminals.

There is, perhaps fortunately, no "German Government in Exile" eager and ready to "take over," as in the case of many of the conquered countries. There will therefore be no problem of dealing with the claims of a German Government in Exile.

The main work of creating the fabric of a new political life in Germany must certainly be in the hands of the men and women who remained in Germany and survived the long Nazi tyranny. They are the ones who have borne the burden and heat of the long struggle against the Gestapo terror. They have been in touch with the masses.

Germany should not be divided or dismembered by the victors. That would be contrary to the whole trend of economic life in all industrial countries which has been in the direction of a single strong Central government with more and more central planning and unified control. To attempt to parcel out Germany into many and relatively weak states as in the Bismarckian or pre-Bismarckian days would be a futile attempt to turn back the clock of time. It would cause undying resentment. It probably could never be permanently enforced except by a permanent army of occupations, which no sane person wants.

Nor should an attempt be made to impose from without a ready made democratic constitution or democratic system,; it would soon become deformed and cease to be a real democracy. Moreover, such a procedure would be contrary to Point Three of the Atlantic Charter which promises to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

A real and successful democracy can only be one of slow growth in which the people voluntarily cooperate and participate. Furthermore, democracy begins at home, that is, it starts best in small communities such as villages and towns, where the people are mostly acquainted with one another personally, as is largely the case in that land of most vigorous and long standing true democracy, Switzerland.

Therefore it should be the aim of the United Nations first of all to foster local self-government in Germany. In every village there will be some men after the destruction of Nazism who will be recognized by their neighbors as decent and trustworthy. We do not know today who they are. But they will come" forward or be discovered when the Gestapo is no longer an omnipresent terror--perhaps a Lutheran pastor, a former burgomasters, a postman or other civil servant a decent army officer or soldier who is disillusioned about militarism, a former trade-unionist, or a brother or father who returns from a Nazi concentration camp.

The United Nations authorities should cooperate with these potential leaders in bringing order out of chaos. These leaders and their friends can be used in the work of economic reconstruction. It is in this work of practical cooperation, with the assistance of the democratic occupying forces, that the Germans will gradually learn to understand and appreciate democratic government. This presupposes the existence of a large body of "decent Germans," such as Louis Lochner quite correctly assumes to exist in his excellent recent volume, "What About Germany?"