The problem of what to do with Germany after the war is one of the most difficult questions of the future. How can she best be treated so as to be the least menace to her neighbors and the world in the years to come?

To clear the way for a brief discussion of a few points below, it is necessary to make certain assumptions with which the reader may or may not agree, but which cannot for lack of space be argued here. These assumptions, which correspond with the writer's own convictions, are:

That the Nazi armies will be beaten, probably disintegrate of be driven back onto German soil, and forced to unconditional surrender or its equivalent;

Cooling-Off

That the cessation of hostilities will be followed, not by an early peace treaty, but by an "armistice period," a "reconstruction" or "recuperation" period of perhaps two or three years.

That no post-war settlement for Europe will be satisfactory in the long run unless it includes a satisfactory settlement for Germany -- unless it holds out to the German people the prospect of eventual participation on substantially equal terms (as was not the case after 1919) in the political and economic life of the new world order. Fortunately, in respect to economic opportunity this prospect is held out to Germany in Point Four of the Atlantic Charter: ". . . . the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;"

Occupation

That during the armistice or reconstruction period there will be a United Nations military occupation of Germany. In this occupation of Germany it is realistic to suppose that the two greatest air and sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, would have the predominant role.

Will the Bolshevist armies occupy at least a part of Germany before the Western Allies get to Berlin? Will they not want to set up a Communist regime in Germany? Possibly Stalin might occupy East Prussia as a token of victory and a pledge in hand that Germany would fulfill the armistice conditions to be imposed upon her. But, all things considered, it does not seem likely that Stalin will want to Bolshevize Germany or take an exclusive or even leading part in ruling her in the post-war period.

The whole trend of this policy for a dozen years has been more and more away from the Trotsky policy of "world revolution" and the spreading of Communism throughout the globe. In his great statesmanlike speech of November 6, 1942, he said, "It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia, but the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed."

He has repeatedly stated, and we believe with all sincerity, that his main war aim is to free "Russian soil" from the Nazi armies, meaning that he intends to keep only those regions which used to be part of old Tsarist Russia: the Baltic Provinces of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania which in 1940 voted almost unanimously (under pressure) for incorporation into the Soviet the eastern half of pre-war Poland, occupied by Russian in 1939 and inhabited largely not by Poles but by White Russians and Lithuanians; the Ukraine; Bessarabia; and bits of Bukovina and Moldavia. If, in addition to gaining these wide territories for protection against Germany, he is convinced that the Western Allies will take effective measures to prevent a future German menace to Russia, it is more than likely that Stalin will be satisfied to let them undertaker the task. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the other United Nations should come to an understanding as soon as possible with Russia as to the establishment of some plan of "security" in Europe.

The Bolshevists are justly very proud of what they have accomplished in Russia during the past decade. Their pride of accomplishment has naturally been greatly increased by the prodigious achievements of their armies in comparison with the inability of the capitalist nations to open a second front on the continent of Europe.

So it is probable that Stalin, if convinced that he will not be seriously menaced by a post-war Germany, will prefer to turn his attention again to the upbuilding of Russia's proud internal economy and to repairing the ruins of war rather than to policing and controlling Germany. That is why it may be assumed that this unenviable task will fall predominantly to Great Britain and the United States.

Germany's Boundaries

The United Nations, at the cessation of hostilities if not earlier, should reassert and recognize the boundaries of the European states as of 1933, so far as possible (i.e. except for limitations mentioned below.) This reassertion of old boundaries would have the advantage that it would emphasize as an international principal that aggressive conquests by force and in defiance of treaty obligations, such as those made by the Axis Powers, will not be recognized.

However, it will not always be possible or desirable to reassert all the 1933 boundaries, especially where they may have been set aside by subsequent votes of self-determination or where they may have become clearly impracticable. Thus, Germany should keep the Saar Territory which it recovered in 1935 by a free and fair plebiscite and with the blessing of the League of Nations. Russia will keep the "Russian" territories noted above which she occupied in 1939-40, some of which were clearly too small and weak for an independent existence and voted (under pressure, to be sure) to become part of the Soviet Union.

To let Stalin keep these territories would seem to be inconsistent with the principle of "boundaries as in 1933." But one has to be realistic; they are in his possession.

Furthermore, unlike Hitler and Mussolini who started a disturbance of the peace of Europe by aggressively and forcibly seizing other peoples' territories, Stalin acted only after a general European war had been started by others, and then only took such territories as had formerly been part of tsarist Russia and which he felt were necessary for Russia's self-defense in the face of Hitler's sweeping victories. The sooner the Poles and the Baltic populations reconcile themselves to these stern realities, however cruel for themselves, the better.

Danube Mixup

The complicated boundary questions in the Danubian and Balkan areas cannot be discussed in this article. It may be added that in urging that the principle of "The boundaries of 1933 as far as possible" be recognized at or prior to the armistice period, one does not necessarily preclude the possibility of later boundary modifications which conditions may make it desirable for the United Nations or for a new international body to agree upon.

In accordance--with this 1933 principle, Germany would lose all the territorial acquisitions made by Hitler except the Saar. Alsace-Lorraine would go back to France; Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium; the Corridor and the other annexed Polish territories of Poland. Austria would be separate and independent until a pledbiscite or an agreement should decide whether it should be reunited with Germany, remain independent, or find a new existence in some kind of a Danubian federation or new arrangement. The Sudeten Germans would remain with the Czechs within the natural mountain frontier of Czechoslovakia as in 1933, except such Sudeten Germans as preferred to migrate to the Reich.

Post-War Germany

What will happen in Germany, as the war drawn to a close? Will there be a revolt of the army or its officers against the Nazi Party? Or a civilian uprising in Germany? Probably not. Communism? Possibly sporadic efforts to establish it. More likely, however, there will be more or less chaotic conditions after the Nazi totalitarian machine has ben destroyed and its leaders have been assassinated, or taken to flight or hiding, or handed over to be punished as war criminals.

There is, perhaps fortunately, no "German Government in Exile" eager and ready to "take over," as in the case of many of the conquered countries. There will therefore be no problem of dealing with the claims of a German Government in Exile.

The main work of creating the fabric of a new political life in Germany must certainly be in the hands of the men and women who remained in Germany and survived the long Nazi tyranny. They are the ones who have borne the burden and heat of the long struggle against the Gestapo terror. They have been in touch with the masses.

Germany should not be divided or dismembered by the victors. That would be contrary to the whole trend of economic life in all industrial countries which has been in the direction of a single strong Central government with more and more central planning and unified control. To attempt to parcel out Germany into many and relatively weak states as in the Bismarckian or pre-Bismarckian days would be a futile attempt to turn back the clock of time. It would cause undying resentment. It probably could never be permanently enforced except by a permanent army of occupations, which no sane person wants.

Nor should an attempt be made to impose from without a ready made democratic constitution or democratic system,; it would soon become deformed and cease to be a real democracy. Moreover, such a procedure would be contrary to Point Three of the Atlantic Charter which promises to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

A real and successful democracy can only be one of slow growth in which the people voluntarily cooperate and participate. Furthermore, democracy begins at home, that is, it starts best in small communities such as villages and towns, where the people are mostly acquainted with one another personally, as is largely the case in that land of most vigorous and long standing true democracy, Switzerland.

Therefore it should be the aim of the United Nations first of all to foster local self-government in Germany. In every village there will be some men after the destruction of Nazism who will be recognized by their neighbors as decent and trustworthy. We do not know today who they are. But they will come" forward or be discovered when the Gestapo is no longer an omnipresent terror--perhaps a Lutheran pastor, a former burgomasters, a postman or other civil servant a decent army officer or soldier who is disillusioned about militarism, a former trade-unionist, or a brother or father who returns from a Nazi concentration camp.

The United Nations authorities should cooperate with these potential leaders in bringing order out of chaos. These leaders and their friends can be used in the work of economic reconstruction. It is in this work of practical cooperation, with the assistance of the democratic occupying forces, that the Germans will gradually learn to understand and appreciate democratic government. This presupposes the existence of a large body of "decent Germans," such as Louis Lochner quite correctly assumes to exist in his excellent recent volume, "What About Germany?"

What has just been said is not merely a wishful-thinking dream. There are many factors which will make for the success of a beginning in local self-government which have not been wholly eradicated by even ten years of Nazi rule.

These factors are the Protestant and Catholic Church organizations, the traditions of trade-unionism among the older members of the working classes, a considerable part of the formerly efficient and honest civil servants, and the remnants of more than a century of excellent city government and municipal administration.

From the Bottom Up

When, after a year or two, democracy has got started on a local basis, regional democratic governments could be built upon it, either might be hoped that some kind of following the lines of the 35 electoral districts of the Weimer Republic (which Hitler adopted as his Gau districts), or following the lines of 17 "Lands" of the Weimar Republic or the 25 States of the Bismarekian era.

Eventually, upon these regional governments, after people had gained experience in practical democracy in the local and regional areas with the assistance of the democratic occupying authorities, it central government could be set up, probably federal in character, but with large powers in the hands of the central government as in the case of the Weimar Republic.

Such a German government would then be ready to be a worthy member for full participation on equal and dignified terms in that "Council of Europe" which Mr. Winston Churchill seemed to discern as he "peered through the mists of the future": on the evening of Sunday March 21, 1943.

THE AUTHOR,

Sidney B. Fay, professor of History, was born in Washington, D. C. and attended school there. He obtained his A.B. here with the Class of '96 and completed his education in Paris, Berlin, and at Columbia University. He has taught history, besides here, at Dartmouth, Smith, Amherst, and Columbia.

A student of European history and an authority on Germany and its people, Fay was called upon to prepare memoranda for Colonale House, Wilson's closest friend and adviser. These were to be used in the Versailles peace conference; he ruefully admits today that his suggestions were not carried out.

Many magazine articles and books on historical and political subjects have been published by Fay. His best-known book is "Origins of the World War" in which he destroys the dogma of German war guilt which was so popular after the armistice.

Fay's insight into the problems of Germany after the war has been gained through his many visits to that country. Both immediately after the last war and in more recent years he has spent much time there studying the conditions of reconstruction and later of Hitler's rise to power.