For one, despite the precious political capital wasted by neoconservative elements in the American foreign policy establishment on turning the Syrian civil war into a geopolitical proving ground, there is plenty to be gained vis-à-vis Syria by allowing Russia its stake in the East Mediterranean. Among the doomsday scenarios foreseeable on Syria’s horizon—a jihadist takeover, a violent redrawing of century-old borders, the roiling status quo—seeking Russia’s cooperation by respecting its naval interests in Tartus and Latakia hardly registers as menacing.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Russia’s fear of a rebel takeover in Damascus has to do just as much, if not more, with concerns about regional jihadist spillover, which could ignite the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus and threaten Moscow with yet another wave of Islamic-tinged Chechen terrorism. In Russia’s support for “the devil you know” in Damascus, America—however it calculates its interests in the Syrian struggle—ought to recognize a power motivated by familiar concerns about radical insurgency and global terror, and find within it a basis for collaboration.

Moreover, for Americans concerned about a maximalist Chinese rise, full of designs on both the Eurasian heartland and the Pacific Rim, there is good reason to be optimistic about Russia’s ambitions to dominate its historical near abroad. In a remarkable geopolitical twist, Russia’s fear of Chinese domination of Central Asia has transformed the northern giant’s presence in the former Soviet “stans” into a strategic complement, rather than a direct challenge, to America’s overstretched military presence. As China dawns as the only possible Cold War-style rival on America’s horizons, Moscow can become, in pursuing its own narrowly construed self-interest, an unintentional contractor for Washington in the Asian interior.

Let us hope that the crisis in Ukraine is resolved peacefully—not only for the sake of Ukrainian national aspirations and the post-Cold War territorial order, but perhaps most importantly, for the sake of a rational adjustment of America’s approach toward 21st century Russia. For what it’s worth, recent events in Crimea have finally laid to rest the notion that Russian regional ambitions can be neutralized by diplomatic inducement. It is now up to us not to avoid falling for the opposite canard: that Russia remains implacably captive to a Cold War mentality of world domination. The truth lies somewhere in the middle; an overburdened America should do whatever it can to harness Russia’s self-interest where it intersects with our own.

Joshua B. Lipson ’14, a Crimson editorial writer, is a Near Eastern languages and civilizations concentrator in Winthrop House.