Meanwhile, other pressures have begun to inhibit the dissemination of information itself.

In response to urging from U.S Attorney General John Ashcroft, thirty-two of the nation’s leading scientific journals—the primary forum for the exchange of vanguard research—announced last year their intention to self-censor, pledging to nix publications that could lead to a terrorist attack.

In addition to these broad directives and prohibitions, restrictions can rear their head on the more localized level, in the form of conditions placed on an individual federal grant.

Harvard automatically rejects contracts that place any conditions on researchers’ freedom to use their findings—such as their ability to publish results.

Last year, MIT refused a $400,000 grant from the National Security Agency because it would have required disclosure of information about international researchers contributing to an unclassified study.

CONCERNS AND OPPOSITION

A cadre of researchers at Harvard and its peers says the new regulations create a culture clash, closing science’s vital channels of openness in both directions: talented researchers are no longer able to contribute, and important information can no longer be shared for further progress.

A conference last year at the Kennedy School of Government’s John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum brought many of these concerns to the public eye. There, Bloom, the SPH dean, joined MIT President Charles M. Vest and Former Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall to argue that opportunities for the free exchange of knowledge must remain available, even in the wake of Sept. 11.

“I believe that restriction is rarely advisable, and certainly rarely feasible, in this environment,” Vest said. “Restrictions on our teaching and where our students come from are unlikely to counter [national security] concerns.”

Bloom alleged that the set of post-Sept. 11 restrictions undermines the basic pedagogical goals of a research university.

“It’s creating ignorance among the greatest universities and the brightest students,” he said.

At Harvard, restrictions on who can work with select agents mean that SPH scientists from a few blackballed nations, mainly Middle-Eastern countries, aren’t able to pursue work with the most dangerous biological pathogens.

According to Bloom, the restrictions haven’t sunk any projects so far, but the University isn’t yet out of the woods. The rigorous background scrutinies now required by the government could dissuade some scientists from taking on major projects, he explains.

Casey has been trying to make sure that background checks take place as expediently as possible, so that prospective researchers aren’t prevented from meeting academic deadlines.

In the realm of publication restrictions, Casey is working with peer universities to document and devise a unified strategy against conditional contracts.