But increased federal attention to scientific research hasn’t come without costs.

Since Sept. 11 scientists have found their work itself under greater scrutiny—and, in some cases, facing new restrictions. Researchers from nations deemed sponsors of terrorism have been barred from work involving nearly 80 biological pathogens—the very front on which anti-terrorism work is concentrated.

In other cases, previously publishable studies are no longer able to find a place in journals for fear of disseminating information that terrorists could use against the country.

Combined with increasing use in government documents of a “sensitive” category of research—an undefined term out of use since the Cold War—these restrictions have impelled some research leaders to discuss a “chilling” effect within the academy.

For scientific research, critics say, the new regulations continue to be a mixed blessing, bringing in valuable funding for important new work while in some cases imposing unwelcome conditions on these projects.

Some of the Patriot Act’s more extreme provisions—such as a section allowing wiretapping without previously required court approval—are scheduled to “sunset” next year, and Casey says he presently expects Congress to support the shutdown of some of the Act’s requirements.

Still, he cites a “culture of secrecy” within the Department of Defense, suggesting that the future is vague still.

With resolution still fixed indefinitely in the future, debate rages on among the nation’s top scholars, academic leaders and, in some cases, its legislators. Bills that would scale back some of the Patriot Act’s provisions are presently under debate in the Senate and the House.

While some demand that the new restrictions be scaled back, others suggest that systematic problems with existing post-Sept. 11 legislation are not sufficient reason for governmental regulation to back off entirely. In fact, Richard Clarke, former senior adviser to three presidents and a lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government, suggests that the program’s greatest weakness is its present insufficiency.

“We haven’t spent the money on homeland security we should have spent,” he said. “It’s still a very small program relative to what we need to do to reduce our vulnerabilities here at home.”

—Staff writer Nathan J. Heller can be reached at heller@fas.harvard.edu