But Champion says it was the government—both the state and federal environmental agencies—that cost Harvard the most. He says a Harvard team from the School of Public Health investigated the health and environmental risks of the project before it was begun, and that the government devoted years of research only to conclude exactly what Harvard had discovered at the outset—that the plant was safe.

“[In the beginning] the science was all with us and in the end it was all with us,” he says. “The politics caused us the problems. Harvard had the best case and it was being ignored by the government. The government cost Harvard a lot of money.”

Specifically, Champion says the government upped MATEP’s price tag by changing its mind on the project’s fate so many times.

“They never said no, but they never said yes, so it went on and on,” Champion says. “ I blame the government for being responsible for a lot of the costs,”

He says the proof is in the pudding.

“The project was ultimately successful,” he says. “There was no environmental damage or problem. The only big problem we had was that the hold-up made it cost more money for Harvard than it should have.”

The Dirty Neighbor

But nearly 30 years after MATEP’s inception, Boston and Brookline residents still paint a different, much less rosy picture than Champion.

Brookline lawyer Daniel G. Partan, who chaired a town committee to investigate the health and environmental risks of MATEP in the 1970s, says Harvard used its clout to turn the tables in the University’s favor.

He says because Harvard began construction of MATEP and bought the diesel generators before it had been granted governmental permission, it made it “politically impossible to deny the plant its permit.”

“They used their economic and political muscle to push the project through by beginning to construct the plant without a permit and by putting up a stack, which was enormously expensive,” Partan says. “They also purchased the diesel generators before they were licensed to construct and operate the plant. What this did for them was ensure that this plant would be built.”

He says the situation suffered from a lack of equity between the two sides.

“If there had been a level playing field, if the community had the kind of political and economic power that Harvard had, I think the rational decision would have been to deny the project,” he says.

He says that because MATEP took so long to be turned on, Harvard “wound up being stuck with really antiquated equipment” that was not environmentally friendly.

“It’s become quite clear that the kind of technology that was used in the facility is not a benign technology,” he says. “The University went ahead and purchased diesel generators that run on residual fuel, which is the least expensive and, incidentally, the most dirty fuel.”