French garrison provides a level of security unavailable in Aden, which is

likely one of the reasons the U.S. has used this African port for refueling since the Gulf War. The prospect of basing U.S. policy in the region on flawed and dangerous assumptions presages further unacceptable risks for U.S. forces and personnel.

The increased U.S. military presence in Yemen--characterized by refueling stops, publicized visits by American military leaders and involvement in the country's land-mine-removal program--coincided with an increased interest in portraying the government of President Ali Abdallah Saleh as an emerging democracy on the Arabian Peninsula. This was highlighted by the planned visit of Hillary Clinton to the Yemeni-hosted Emerging Democracies Forum in June 1999 (a visit that was later cancelled, possibly due to security reasons).

Yemen is far from being a democratic, liberal state, but moves towards better governance should be supported. However, shifting refueling operations from Djibouti to Aden was a classic case of misapplying military resources to a non-strategic, threat-intensive mission. The naval presence, if anything, actually complicated the situation. Unlike typical uses of the Navy in nation-building efforts, where sailors work with local communities to build infrastructure while injecting dollars into the local economy, in Yemen sailors were either restricted to ship or portside. The U.S. presence--involving the use of Adens port by combatants en route to conduct operations against Iraq--was seen by local extremists as an attempt to turn Aden and Socotra Island into an American base to support activities against a country they have long backed.

Our embassy in Yemen, CENTCOM and the intelligence community certainly saw the same threat information: a precedent of attacks combined with violently anti-American groups in a fluid environment wherein penetration of the government and local companies assisting the U.S. refueling operations was probable. The alleged tip-off by an Arab ally of possible anti-U.S. operations in the region, combined with the onset of Arab-Israeli violence and Baghdads renewed efforts to break out of the sanctions box, should have underscored the need for extra precautions.

Given the record, it seems that a decision was made to deemphasize the

threats in order to push a pro-Yemen policy agenda. If CENTCOM had visions of using Aden to support American troops in regional missions it shows a shortsightedness with respect to vulnerability, as well as a lack of understanding that such actions would