The bad state of affairs was not helped by the fact that most of Chechnya's infrastructure had been destroyed and many cities and towns reduced to rubble, creating an unemployment rate estimated at 60 percent. Reconstruction aid promised by Russia unsurprisingly never showed up. In these circumstances Chechnya's side into chaos is not surprising and probably inevitable.

If Chechnya were to gain independence in this war, the devastation would be even worse and Russian aid even less forthcoming. Life for most people in Chechens would be nasty, brutish and short. The unfortunate fact is that the rule of a distant, incompetent and corrupt government is a better way to live than the war of all against all which would ensue in an independent, but devastated Chechnya.

The consequences of Chechen independence would not only be misery for the Chechens but a destabilization of the already unsteady Caucasus. During the past few years of autonomy, Chechnya became home to several foreign Islamic fundamentalist warlords, who have taken advantage of the confusion and abundance of arms to use it as a base for spreading rebellion in neighboring provinces. Russians often point to the Chechen government's ties to organized crime, and warn that an independent Chechen state could quickly become a conduit for drugs and smuggled arms. There is little doubt that that a Chechnya that wins its independence--but is devastated in the attempt--will quickly turn into a black hole of anarchy in the Caucasus.

But keeping Chechnya under Russian control is stricken with almost as many problems. The devastation the Russian army has left in its wake has done irreparable damage to any sort of legitimacy the Russian government might have had to rule the Chechens. Russia recently tried to organize a loyalist government--the only Chechen who would co-operate with them was a former mayor of Grozny in Russian prison following his conviction for embezzlement. In every shelled village, everyone who is killed or maimed leaves behind several family members who fiercely hate the Russian army and its rule.

Hopes that the U.S. could somehow influence Russian policy are equally naive. The war has proved exceedingly popular in Russia, and the only two politicians to oppose it are a catspaw of the Chechen mafia and Grigory Lavlinsky, the hopeless neo-liberal whose principled stand got him denounced as a traitor to the Russian cause. As the generals leading the war make veiled threats to politicians who might oppose the war, the talk of cutting off foreign aid and diplomatic pressure is an exercise in unreality. At present, the only U.S. policy that could bring real comfort to the Chechen, is helping the refugees and displaced civilians.

The Chechen conundrum has no easy solutions. We must be wary of sliding into the classic response of seeing an oppressed minority and leaping forward, enthusiastic they they should have their own state. Nor should we relax, confident that Russia's reconquest of the province will restore stability. The only sure consequence of this war is that Chechnya will be destabilized for years and possibly decades to come. Perhaps the West can serve a useful role when the fighting has ended in advising or reconstruction. Regardless, for the corpses of Russian conscripts and Chechen civilians mouldering amidst the harsh beauty of the Caucasus, this war has been worth very little at all.

Charles C. De Simone '01 is a government concentrator in Dunster House.