In 1968, the courts supported three Arkansas State Penitentiary prisoners who claimed that the use of leather strap was "cruel and unusual." The decision in the case of Jackson vs. Bishop states that "the strap's use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions which may be imposed, offends contemporary concepts of decency and human dignity, and precepts of civilization which we profess to possess. "Nevertheless, six of the nine points listed to explain this finding concerned the difficulties of regulating corporal punishment.

We find the judges wondering, for the example, "If whipping were to be authorized, how does one...ascertain the point which would distinguish the permissible from that which is cruel and unusual?"

The judges went on to suggest that whipping generates hate and lacks public support.

Yet confinement to prison generates hate as much as any whipping. And public opinion, at least in the Fay case, has clearly supported corporal punishment. A regulated use of corporal punishment, such as that in Singapore, would address the constitutional concerns of the court.

My point is not necessarily that Michael Fay should be caned. In this case, an eye for an eye, or an egg for an egg, might be most appropriate; certainly nothing has been perpetrated that a little community service couldn't repair.

Allegations have arisen that Fay has been made a scapegoat, and that corporal punishment for his case is excessive even by Singaporean standards.

These are serious indictments of any justice system that must be investigated before any punishment is administered.

Still, the accusations of inhumanity leveled at Singapore by Amnesty International and in the American media are hypocritical and naive.

The fact is that far greater inhumanity flourishes under our own justice system, and our prisons are no more humane than the corporal punishment employed in Singapore.

Ultimately, the conditions of our jails and our streets demand that we consider alternative techniques.

The immediate dismissal of an inexpensive and apparently highly effective form of criminal justice serves neither citizen nor criminal, but only a quixotic conscience.