But Perot supporters wanted deeper deficit cuts. Depending on whose baseline you use, Clinton's budget would reduce the deficit by more than $100 billion. Clinton says $140 billion, but it's more like $104 billion, according to Harvard Assistant Professor of Economics Douglas W. Elmendorf. Whatever the number, it's not low enough for Perotians, most of whom would like Clinton to eliminate the thing entirely.
Finally, on gays in the military, Perot supporters feel about the same as most Americans on the issue (42 percent of Perotians and 43 percent of all respondents favor ending the ban). But they also feel that Clinton shouldn't be wasting his time pursuing something so explosive. They want him to work on the economy. Period.
How can Clinton go about attracting this vital group of voters? Evidence from last year's campaign suggests a few answers.
Clinton must remember who Perot supporters are and how they differed from Clinton supporters last year. Contrary to press speculation, Perot supporters were not appreciably different from Clinton supporters (or Bush supporters) in regional origin, ideological bent, income, race or education. For example, the average income of committed Clinton supporters was $39,430; it was $40,010 for committed Perot supporters.
The main difference between Perot and Clinton voters dealt with their view of politics as usual. Perotians hate politics. Clintonites are more ambivalent. Nearly three-quarters of Perot supporters felt last year that the two-party system does not "serv[e] this country well," according to a September Harris poll. Only 60 percent of Clinton supporters agreed with that assessment. Almost 20 percent more Perot supporters than Clinton supporters described their interest in politics as "somewhat low" or "low." And fully 92 percent of Perot supporters surveyed in June agreed that "[w]e need a president like Perot who is not a conventional politician."
Even the Perot voters' focus on the deficit belies their hatred of politics as usual. The deficit is essentially a political issue. Unlike unemployment, declining wages or falling exports, the deficit is a total political creation: Members of Congress and the president decide how much spending and taxation the country will undertake. When Republicans refuse to raise taxes and Democrats refuse to cut spending, the deficit goes up. Economics has little to do with it (although the effects of high deficits can clearly be disastrous).
What does this mean for Clinton? Obviously he must focus on deficit reduction, but there are easier steps he can take as well: The President should push Congress to pass a credible campaign reform law. Limits on spending, public funding, more restrictions on PACs--these steps would increase Perotians' faith in the system and endear them to Clinton until at least 1996.
In addition, Clinton should snub his lobbyist friends and stick it to them. He's asked for a tax on firms' use of lobbyists, and he should go farther--ensuring public disclosure of lobbyists' activities is a necessity.
Clinton should also publicly advocate free air time for third-party candidates. Even if a minimum threshold level of support is required to qualify (and there should be one), Perotians would be grateful.
Clinton's start has not been dismal, and those who argue (even on this page) that he's pissed off just about everyone are wrong. According to a recent Wall Street Journal poll, Perot supporters are still giving Clinton the benefit of the doubt over Republicans in Congress, and most liberals and neoliberals like his economic plan.
But Clinton must remember the roots of Perot support--disgust with the political system--if he is to win their hearts and votes.
Clinton's brand of neoliberalism is winning over liberals but alienating Perot voters in the process.
Perotians hate politics as usual. Clinton must remember that if he is to win their support.