The Times said that "jury members hugged and kissed Nelson, toasted him and some angrily defended their verdict." Such an "insensitive celebration," as the newspaper described it, exhibited not only callousness, but may be an indication of improper collaboration between lawyer and jury beyond the already shady relationship developed in the pre-trial selection process. As a federal investigation continues to uncover the perpetrators of the Crown Heights violence, many feel justice has not been served.
Clearly, trial by jury is a necessary evil, as many legal experts argue. It is a popular check against abuses of authority that could occur in an independent judiciary. Federal judges may feel indebted to senators who appointed them. Or state judges may be connected to governors or lawyers who nominated them. In a judicial system without checks and popular participation, these judges might engage in corrupt political dealings and remain unaccountable to the public. The current case of Sol Wachtler, chief judge of New York State, who has resigned from the bench in the wake of charges that he threatened to extort money from a woman with whom he had an affair, is indicative of such improprieties.
But the institution of the jury is a mixed blessing. Professor of Law Alan M. Dershowitz, in his recently published Contrary to Popular Opinion, describes the American jury as the "conscience of the community." This "quixotic conscience," he says, sometimes reflects the best of what we stand for and other times the worst. Thus, in the '60s, all-white juries acquitted Klansmen who had murdered civil rights workers in the South and today, inner city juries acquit Black defendants charged with murdering law enforcement officials--a trend of minority distrust of police officers that was evident in the Kahane and Rosenbaum cases.
The issue of jury selection is a crucial one since the composition of the panel of jurors who will decide the defendant's fate can mean the difference between guilty and innocent. The fact that different juries can arrive at different conclusions in cases with similar facts highlights the great effect lawyers' jury choices have on the outcome of trials.
Certainly lawyers must have the right to oppose selection of a jury member who would be unfairly biased against his or her side, but the extent to which attorneys are permitted to veto inclusion of potential jurors by using "peremptory" challenges must be limited. Such opposition is not based on clear possibilities of bias on the part of the potential juror, but to a non-"cause" related reason.
These disqualifications must be supported by a "neutral explanation" and cannot simply be a factor of the potential juror's race. But improper disqualifications still occur that prevent cases from being heard by an impartial jury of the defendant's peers.
The current system of jury selection that produces panels in favor of either the defense or prosecution is not that different from the "blue ribbon juries" of the past where only the most intelligent people in a community were placed on jury rolls. Such elitism prevented justice from being served in the courts. From looking at recent cases where defendants were acquitted by juries stacked with members friendly to the defense, it's clear that giving lawyers too much freedom in the selection of jury members does not produce just results either.