Before the ground war became a reality, several scholars said they were reluctant to support the push for military action. Some said they feared the liberation of Kuwait would mean high casualities. The media and the military depicted the Iraqi military machine as a formidable foe--something it was not, they now say.
"We were led to believe there would be high casualties," says Albert Carnesale, Littauer professor of public policy and administration.
"Everyone was afraid of troop casualties," says Kurt M. Campbell, associate professor of public policy at the Kennedy School. "It is now clear that there were very few casualties." Campbell recently returned to Harvard after a two year stint as special assistant to the National Security Council.
Campbell says that past experience in desert warfare supported the belief that a ground war must necessarily cost many American lives.
Other professors say, however, that diplomatic steps could still have been used to avoid the possibility of a ground war. While the Soviet peace plan was not acceptable, President Bush should have allowed more time for diplomatic manueverings, they say.
"They did not give adequate chance for the diplomatic process," says Herbert C. Kelman, Cabot professor of social ethics. "They did not take the Soviet effort seriously. They did not give it a chance to play itself out."
Two Objectives
Bush's decision to reject the Soviet peace plan had two objectives, scholars say. Not only did the U.S. want to reduce Hussein's arsenal, but the Administration wanted to leave the Iraqi leader little room to claim any sort of victory--military, moral or otherwise. Arabs would then have little reason to regard him as a hero, experts say.
Says Haggard, "They are allowing him no opportunity for claiming victory. There is no interest on the part of the Administration. Whether it is a smart move remains to be seen. They have as two possible models Versailles and Japan."
In Versailles, the Germans were humiliated and forced to pay reparations. The ultimate result, most scholars agree, was World War II. But Japan, after its defeat in World War II, has become a close ally of the United States.
But the acceptance of the Soviets' peace plan, many scholars now say, would have left a devious Saddam Hussein too much room to maneuver, both diplomatically and militarily.
"After all, Saddam Hussein has a reputation for deception. If we had gone along and given him three weeks, it is plausible he would change his mind and set other conditions," says Nye.
...By the middle of the week, international relations experts were left to reconcile their theories with actual events.