With Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians lined around the table, Israel was counting on the United States to be, if not sympathetic to her longtime ally, at least an honest broker in the peace negotiations. The Bush administration response represents the first time in a while that Israel not only has to second guess American intentions, but also the president's fundamental support.

By refusing to compromise with Israel over the request for a five-day delay to prepare for the start of negotiations or clarify support for moving the talks to the Middle East in the near future, Bush suggests that the Israelis should prepare to be on the receiving end of greater pressure in the future.

If Israel hadn't stood up now to the administration's "bullying tactics," as one Israeli official called them, the Jewish state would find herself being forced to accept U.S.-imposed solutions on more substantive issues further down the road.

The U.S. agenda may seem pretty innocuous at the moment. After all, Bush is just trying to get the combatants sitting around the same table at the same time. But the administration has already begun to play an active role in the more significant portion of the talks by including compromise suggestions with the invitations mailed out last week.

By calling for negotiation of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Bush not only proposed action opposed by virtually the entire political spectrum in Israel, but also called into question policies that could greatly threaten Israel's existence.

The president and his advisers wouldn't have to live in the Golan valley, in constant fear of a Syrian artillery attack from above. The Israelis are the ones who must live with the consequences of the negotiations.

That is why Shamir had to say no to the U.S. now. Otherwise, Israel would be expected later on to simply accept imposed solutions with much graver consequences.

THE DEBATE OVER the site of negotiations itself is not a trivial matter. It makes sense for Israel to desire locations in the Middle East.

Not only would closer proximity to Jerusalem allow top Israeli officials to participate in the talks on a regular basis, but also travelling from Israeli to Arab towns would de facto signify recognition of Israel's right to exist.

One-on-one talks alternating between Egyptian and Israeli towns produced the Camp David Accords in 1979. It is the only existing peace treaty between the Jewish state and any of its Arab neighbors. The Israelis see no reason to abandon a framework that worked in the past.

Alternating between Arab and Israeli towns, says Israeli Consul-General for New England Yaakov Levy, would have a secondary effect of sensitizing indigenous populations to the new attitude of peace in the region.

"Citizens," Levy said of the Egyptian and Israeli populations in 1979, "gradually got the true sense that talks were going on. Egypt, like the other Arab states, does not allow freedom of the press. Seeing the motorcade pass through your village may be the only way a Syrian, Jordanian, or Lebanese knows that peace might exist with the Jewish neighbor."

The Arab states refuse to negotiate in Israeli towns lest it appear that Israel's right to exist had been accepted.

Bush should shift gears, turn his finger away from Israel and pressure the Arabs to show up on Israeli soil. It was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 that sparked the Camp David Accords. A similar confidence-building measure from the Arabs now could really jumpstart the peace process.

WITH THE CONFERENCE already stacked in the Arabs' favor, Israel needs Bush to be an honest broker. It is Israel that is being asked to make substantive territorial concessions. The Arab nations are only expected to recognize Israel's right to exist.