Support of this kind from the five permanent members of the council as they stand today is unheard of. Such unprecedented global support for a military invasion surely suggests at least one other thing: that President Bush can now expect extraordinary cooperation in an economic blockade that would rival the greatest castle siege.

It is expensive to maintain an embargo, particularly for a period of months or years. But it is far less expensive than a war, and it costs far fewer lives. For all the assurances that an American invasion would be a quick, devastating affair, there are a dozen analysts, military strategists and combat veterans who claim the opposite.

The risks of a protracted groundwar are unacceptable if an embargo could accomplish the same ends.

And the renewed application of economic pressure is clearly the option most favored even by nations that support the council ultimatum: neither the Soviet Union nor China are strongly supportive of American intervention. Nor are the American people clamboring for a massive military engagement. Public approval ratings will not drop precipitously if the President announces that rather than risk thousands of American lives to begin a confrontation that may continue indefinitely, he has elected to maintain an increasingly unbreakable international blockade.

THIS course of action does not aid the hundreds of American and other hostages who remain trapped in Iraq and Kuwait. How many of them will survive the severe hardship and possible hysteria that a successful long-term embargo might engender? It is possible that they will be reasonably well treated to maintain their status as "human shields"; it is just as possible that they will be used as leverage against American opinion in more sinister ways.

Does the United States have an obligation, separate from other considerations, to rescue its captive citizens, whatever the cost? Such a call has shades of jingoistic fervor; it also strikes a powerful chord. This is perhaps the hardest decision the United States must face. But it is arguably the only valid consideration. Saving the hostages must be a strong enough reason on its own.

Thomas Gewecke '91 is president of the Harvard International Relations Council.