There is no discussion of how numbers were assigned to vague notions like frustration and instability, or any margin of error (as in the sciences) for such a decimal figure. As far as I am concerned, that sentence is nonsense. Huntington gives similar "correlations" to two or three significant figures, pages 39 through 53, so the one I have mentioned is not an isolated example.

(b) Is it meaningful to measure "social frustration" or "economic development" or "political instability" according to some absolute scale, applicable at all times, to all countries, or to such diverse countries as are listed in the paragraph following the equations? Huntington lists France, Belgium, and the Union of South Africa as "satisfied" societies with "high degrees of political instability," while the Philippines are only one of two "dissatisfied" countries with a "high level of political stability." Huntington's book was written in 1968. Can the "political (in)stability" of Belgium, say, be compared with that of Argentina, or that of the Philippines? Do you really think Belgium was (is) politically unstable, let alone to a high degree? Is political instability to be measured in the short run, in the long run (the past year, the next five years, the next 10 years, the next 20 years)? Do France and Belgium exhibit "high degrees of political instability" in the same context as do Morocco and the Union of South Africa?

Or for that matter, the Philippines. Marcos's dictatorship in 1968 planted the seeds of rising rebellions a decade later, and his replacement by Aquino two decades later. Why is the Union of South Africa listed as having a "high level of political instability" in 1968, while the Philippines have a "high level of political stability"? The situation in South Africa appears to me parallel in one respect to that of the Philippines, with a government able to impose itself for a relatively long period while the tension builds up and the period may end up in a bloody revolution. After all, it took 146 years for the French ancien regime (say, from 1643--Louis XIV's coming as a King--to 1789) to evolve into the French revolution. I would not call the ancien regime "highly politically stable". Different people have perceived differently during those 146 years, and since.

(c)What is much more insidious, however, and illustrates how a political opinion is passed off as political "science" is the classification of the Union of South Africa as a "satisfied society". In what sense were (are) 20 million Blacks "satisfied"? In 1968? Today? Note how Huntington's political opinion about the Union of South Africa being a "satisfied society" is embedded in a tissue of pseudo-science consisting of "equations," "correlations," decimal figure, "ratios," and a type of language which gives the illusion of science without any of its substance.

Questions about Huntington's classification of the Union of South Africa as a "satisfied" society were originally raised in an unpublished letter to Science by the Yale sophomore Joshua Katz, to whom Huntington's competence and standards are particularly relevant since Huntington's book is required reading in the course Political Science 111 b, which Katz was taking. How critically is Huntington's book examined in such a course? Katz asked the professor teaching the course whether he could pass out his analysis in class, but the professor asked him not to do so. What happens at other universities where Huntington's department at Harvard has written that the book "merits its reputation as one of the true classics of modern political science?" On the other hand, the Yale anthropologist Leopold Pospisil (who is a member of the NAS), wrote to Katz that he "very much like [Katz's] letter as a critique of the social sciences," and he asked Katz's permission to reproduce his letter "for the benefit of students and colleagues."

2. A propos of the Philippines: they are mentioned as a "Case of Highest Concern" in the article "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs," published by Huntington and Richard K. Betts in Winter 1985-1986, before Marcos was out. In this article, the authors include numerous tables, entitled for instance: "Calorie Consumption as Percentage of Daily Requirement and Instability First Year After Death [of Dictator]"; "Urban Population and Instability First Year After Death"; "Literacy and Instability First Year After Death"; "Annual Growth GPD Per Capita and Instability First Year After Death"; with percentages, numbers, and items like "Extensive," "Moderate," "Limited," "None," "Total." I already question the meaning of these tables per se. But in addition, the authors follow these tales by predictions:

"Conceivably, Marcos could retire from office voluntarily, but on the basis of his past performance, this seems very unlikely. Conceivably, he could be forced out of office, but this also seems unlikely...Hence it is highly probable that he will die in office...

"These two factors--previous instability and social organization--virtually insure substantial instability following Marcos's death...

"Hence the greater the probability that Marcos's departure from office will be followed by major revolutionary or quasi revolutionary upheaval. Ghoulish as it may appear, Marcos's ill health is now one of the few factors favoring less instability in the Philippines." The authors write:

"With respect to the other two variables, the U.S. presumably could attempt to induce the authoritarian leader: (a) to coopt and compromise with opposition groups, thereby presumably reducing the instability before his death; and (b) to effect an early retirement from power. Given the ways in which most authoritarian leaders view their interests and the limited leverage the U.S. has in most Third World countries, neither of these courses of action is likely to be very productive." In each item, the statement is either incorrect or very unclear, even incomprehensible to me. The authors' pronouncements, with language like "virtually insure" or "the greater the probability," in the context of tables, numbers, probability and variables, give the illusion of science without its content. Of course, there was political instability in the Philippines before Marcos departed, and there continues to be. I do not question that. I question the pseudo-scientific context of Huntington's article.

Huntington and Betts published another version of their "Dead Dictators" article in the Wall Street Journal (13 August 1986) after Marcos was out. The whole discussion about the Philippines and the false conclusions are omitted, in light of Marcos's replacement by Aquino, which occurred in the meantime. Once more, both articles make it appear as if certain political opinions are rooted in scholarship or science.

Be it said in passing that the original article resulted from a study funded by the CIA, but the source of funding was not given. As a result of a flap at Harvard about this instance, and some others more or less at the same time, the CIA somewhat changed its policy about keeping the source of funding secret, and the CIA is clearly identified as this source in the Wall Street Journal article.

3. In Foreign Affairs, July 1968, Huntington published an article: "The Bases of Accommodation" concerning the Vietnam War. Among other things he writes:

"The principal reason for this massive influx of population into the urban areas is, of course, the intensification of the war following the commitment of American combat troops in 1965...

"In this sense, history--drastically and brutally speeded up by the American impact--may pass the Vietcong by. Societies are susceptible to revolution only at particular stages in their development. At the moment, the rates of urbanization and of modernization in the secure rural areas exceed the rate of increase of Vietcong strength...