The U.S. and `Global Unilateralism'

Despite these shifts in public opinion, we are not likely to return to the isolation we practiced before the Second World War. Our stakes abroad are now too high to make that policy feasible. What we have been doing, it appears, is to shift more and more toward what one Assistant Secretary of State has called "global unilateralism." Whether by air strikes on Libya, withdrawals from international organizations, trade sanctions against Japan, or secret operations in the Middle East and Central America, we seem inclined to pursue our goals around the world with somewhat less attention to the interests of others, somewhat less concern for the reactions of our neighbors, and somewhat less determination to seek collective solutions to common problems.

Initially, it may seem odd that we should retreat from international cooperation at the very time that our commercial, cultural, and economic ties to the rest of the world are steadily growing stronger. After further thought, our behavior is not so difficult to understand.

It was quite natural and easy to be internationalist after 1945, World War II had made us painfully aware of our ties to other parts of the world and our stake in avoiding another global conflict. Russia's march into Eastern Europe and Mao Tse Tung's rise to power made us all fear communist expansion and appreciate that we could never again enjoy the pleasures of isolation.

As we embarked on a more vigorous international role, we found ourselves in a position of unprecedented power. We had a monopoly over atomic weapons. We dominated the global economy, accounting for more than half the world's output. Dozens of nations depended on our military and economic assistance. In such a world, we could enter freely into international organizations with little fear of losing control of the results. Enough countries followed our lead to insure safe working majorities on most important issues. Under these conditions, we could enjoy the fruits of international cooperation with remarkably little danger or cost.

By 1970, however, the situation had changed quite radically. The Soviet Uniion now rivalled us in nuclear weaponry, while Viet Nam revealed the limits to conventional military power. As other nations recovered from the War and started to grow rapidly, our share of world production shrank from over half to a third and ultimately to less than 25 percent. Developing countries no longer felt beholden to us, and United Nations majorities were no longer secure. Indeed, much of the talk that billowed forth from international organizations seemed intemperate, unfriendly, and at times downright irresponsible.

As our ability to control world events grew smaller and other countries proved increasingly independent, irritation mounted and our taste for cooperation began to wane. Our problems with OPEC, Lebanon, Iran, Libya, and even Japan dramatized the frustrations that seemed to dog us whenever we involved ourselves with foreign problems. Small wonder that the spirit of internationalism began to ebb.

Although we can understand the reaons for the shift toward unilateralism, we should not delude ourselves that such a policy will serve us well in the decades ahead. On the contrary, strong forces are at work in the world to limit our power to go it alone.

America's Growing International Reliance

Economically, our share of the world market is bound to decline still further so that neither our trade nor our aid will have even the influence they currently possess. By the year 2000, we will have to rely on foreign markets, foreign goods, foreign investments loom larger in our eonomy, we will be unable to achieve greater growth or reduce our unemployment without the cooperation of the other great economic powers.

Politically, the Cold War already restricts our ability to dictate solutions. Despite the inconvenience of massive immigration from the South, we cannot afford to close our borders and bring intolerable rural unemployment to Mexico and Central America. We fear the consequences of forcing South Africa to reform its system or insisting that Brazil or Argentina pay their debts on time. As the years pass, more and more issues will arise that require the collective efforts of many nations--acid rain, the destruction of the ozone layer, the traffic in drugs, and many more. Such problems will create increasing pressure for cooperative rather than unilateral decisions.

Militarily, just as Viet Nam revealed the limits of our power to commit American troops to combat, so have the last few years demonstrated the practical limits to military spending. As armaments grow ever costlier, and more and more countries threaten to build their own nuclear weapons, the pressures for more effective cooperation will undoubtedly grow in this domain as well.

In every sphere, therefore, the number of problems needing international solutions is mounting while our power to dictate solutions is decreasing. In this kind of a world, global unilateralism will not only be less effective; it will make cooperation more difficult. In international affairs, as in all human undertakings, the search for common solutions works best in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust. We will hardly succeed in creating such a climate for the longer run if we try to go our own way and impose our solutions without paying close attention to the interests of other nations.

For all these reasons, the world that graduating seniors will inherit will be a world that we depend on more but dominate less--a world where circumstances force us to look increasingly toward negotiated solutions. If we can neither control our sister nations nor retreat into isolation, we have no choice but to learn to cooperate more effectively.

Building Durable Forms of Cooperation