These are not novel disclosures. To some, these developments are encouraging; after all, a disarming first strike capability, according to escalation dominance theorists, will translate into concrete political advantages. There is little need for concern, these neo-hawks hasten to add, because the U.S. will not actually exercise this capacity.

It is precisely this self-serving complacency that the authors of To Win a Nuclear War attack. American presidents have, for example, considered using nuclear weapons in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East. Moreover, Kaku and Axelrod report, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy seriously looked at detailed plans to initiate a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

These were not mere contingency plans; they were operational plans advocated by some of the nation's top military and civilian strategists. In his memoirs, Eisenhower recalled that while president-elect he thought "it was clear that we would have to use atomic weapons" in Korea.

SOME OF the judgments expressed in To Win a Nuclear War are open to debate. We cannot, for instance, ever hope to determine with mathematical precision how close any president came on a given occasion to launching a nuclear attack, or what factors ultimately convinced him not to do so. The authors assessment that these decisions were made on prudential, and not moral grounds, seems overstated.

Such problems, however, do not detract from the main lessons to be learned from To Win a Nuclear War. First, there are always those in the upper echelons of the American government and military who, under certain circumstances, will recommend a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union. There will always be some who belive, as does Richard Pipes, that "there is no alternative to war with the Soviet Union if the Russians do not abondon communism."

Second, the absence of a (unclear) against a Soviet retaliatory attack has been perhaps the major factor frustrating plans for a U.S. first strike. Star Wars is destabilizing, therefore, whether or not Reagan or his successors might ever actually launch a pre-emptive strike. It could result in the Soviets adopting--understandably--a "use 'em or lose 'em" mentality.

"THERE'S THE 'peace through trust guys' and the 'peace through strength guys,''' an Army general said a few years ago, sizing up the chief division between nuclear strategists. Not quite. The schism is really between the 'peace through superiority guys' and the 'peace through parity-because-superiority-is unattainable/too costly/too dangerous guys.'

Should the United States seek nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union? Or is superiority a dangerous chimera that we must not pursue? Americans must ultimately decide. Events of the day, though, remind us of the potential for White House strategists to circumvent the wishes and expectations of the American people. It is incumbent, then, that we make our decision clear.