Perhaps it is an occupational hazard: political scientists, even more than academics in other fields, seem to want to see their theories acted out in the real world. Machiavelli, offering unsolicited advice to Renaissance princes, may have been one of the first, but the path is wellworn--as the flow between Harvard's Government Department and Washington attests.

American political scientists, however, sufffer a disadvantage Machiavelli did not face. They usually advise a democratic government; their theories must be adopted by elected representatives, and application is limited by the rule of the law. No single academic theory, however valid, is likely to be put wholesale into practice.

That drawback, if such it can be called, need not confront advisors to the government of South Africa--which is hardly democratic, much less limited by the rule of law. As everyone knows, most South Africans are blocked from meaningful political participation by their skin color; most liberal opposition has been silenced; and the government's executive power is reinforced by draconian security laws.

So perhaps giving unofficial advice to the government of South Africa offers its own peculiar rewards. One would think, at least, that political scientists willing to look at things from the government's perspective would see their theories implemented efficiently.

But alas, such may not always be the case, as Samuel P. Huntington, Eaton Professor of Government, might tell us. Despite clear efforts by the South African government to implement Huntington's confident recommendations, somehow the real world has proved more complex than the academic theory suggested.

In September 1981, Huntington gave the keynote address to the Political Science Association of South Africa's biannual conference. Huntington, of course, is a well-known scholar, and director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. His best-known thesis, drastically simplified, is that rulers in developing countries do well to limit popular demands on government. Too much participation, he argues, allows diverse groups to express sometimes-conflicting wishes and can hurt rulers' ability to enforce stability. This makes it difficult to carry out policies required for economic growth and national integration. (1)

In his 1981 address in Johannesburg (2), Huntington argued that the South African government should follow a policy of simultaneous reform and repression. Reform, he said, was necessary because "it seems likely that a minority-dominated hierarchical ethnic system...will become increasingly difficult to maintain"; the historical demise of other ruling racial minorities suggested apartheid could not survive unchanged. (p. 11). And rather than waiting for a revolutionary overthrow, he suggested that ruling elites might want to shape the changes themselves.

A system of one-person, one-vote--however appealing to Americans, South African white liberals and Blacks--would, Huntington wrote, prove unsatisfactory. Universal franchise "could seriously injure the interests of all four racial groups" by threatening people classified White, Colored or Asian, as minority groups, and leaving Blacks "disadvantaged in the economic system by the application of strictly meritocratic criteria." (p. 13)

Instead, he proposed a "consociational" set-up, where each group would have autonomy in its own affairs, and where each group could veto government policies which might harm its interests. His version of consociationalism requires that the elites of each group trust and cooperate with each other, and that each elite control its followers. "In essence," he wrote, "it is an elite conspiracy to restrain political competition within and among communal groups." (p. 14)

But since neither of these preconditions--cooperation or control--existed in South Africa in 1981, most of Huntington's paper focused on the process through which the basis for such an 'elite conspiracy' could be laid, a process he chose to call "reform." Based on the model of Brazilian President Geisel's "decompression", or "liberalization", Huntington recommended that the South African government pay attention to six factors. In order to wage a "two-front war against both stand-patters and revolutionaries" (p. 16), he said, reformers require:

a skilled political leader, able to inspire confidence and trusts, but also able to "shift allies and enemies from one issue to the next, to convey different messages to different audiences, to sense...public opinion and time his actions accordingly, and to hide his ultimate purpose behind his immediate rhetoric." (p. 17)

a step-by-step approach, letting neither conservatives or radicals know what changes lie ahead; and "blitzkrieg" tactics to get individual reforms through. "The proposed reform is drafted in relative secrecy; ....and then, at the appropriate moment, it is dramatically unveiled...and the reform enacted quickly before its opponents can effectively mobilize." (p. 17)

careful timing of reform, so that the government seems to make changes from a position of strength, rather than in response to demands from below. "Reforms which appear to be granted under pressure from events and the demands of more radical groups can only weaken the regime, strengthen the radicals, lead to more extreme demands from more groups, and provoke a counter-revolutionary backlash." (p. 19)

centralization of power, to "maintain the control over violence that is essential to carry through major reforms." (p. 20) Huntington argued that some form of "enlightened despotism" might help reduce white opposition to change in South Africa, but even more firmly, he suggested the government should repress three types of violence: revolutionary, spontaneous and backlash. "No reform occurs without violence...Within limits reform and repression may proceed hand-in hand...The government that is too weak to monopolize counter-revolutionary repression is also too weak to inaugurate counter-revolutionary reform." (p. 20)

cautious selection of reforms, and deception to avoid mobilizing opposition. The process may require "substantial elements of duplicity, deceit, faulty assumptions, and purposeful blindness." (p. 21) As an example, Huntington suggested that the government of South Africa would find it easier to grant political representation to "Coloreds" and "Asians" if it continued to restrict Black political rights to the bantustans, to reassure conservatives who would otherwise fear that expanding political participation to some people of colour might mean ultimately giving "Africans" the vote.