In early October, the Associate Dean for Research and Allied Institutions in FAS (editor's note: Richard G. Leahy) received a telephone call from a newspaper reporter inquiring about a CMES conference supported by the CIA. The Associate Dean had no knowledge of such a conference and called Professor Safran to inquire further. Professor Safran confirmed the story and was then requested by the Associate Dean to make immediate disclosure to me. As a result, on October 2, 1 was informed of the conference and the CIA support in a letter from Professor Safran.

In response to my inquiries, Professor Safran subsequently stated that: (1) he was willing and able to disclose the source of support; (2) there were no restrictions on publication; and (3) there was no abnormal or intrusive involvement of the sponsor in the framing of the topics and content of the conference. I determined that the agreement should have been institutional because of the extent to which the conference would make use of Harvard's name and facilities. Based on these assurances and conclusions, I permitted the conference to take place provided the source of funding was disclosed to all participants before the conference began and with the understanding that an appropriate charge for indirect cost recovery would be made.

On the weekend before the conference, after I had issued my statement permitting the conference to take place, and a number of the participants had been informed, Professor Safran called me to ask if he should run the conference using CMES as opposed to CIA funds. I told him that with the full disclosure and my public statement, I felt he should proceed with the conference as planned, including the CIA funding. I said that from the standpoint of University Policy, the issue was not the source of funds per se, but the disclosure.

After the conference, I had the opportunity to review the contract itself. It contains a reference to "services of a confidential nature" and then defines services as "coordinating and chairing a conference...at the unclassified level." Professor Safran assured me that the initial phrase alluded only to the conference, which is by nature public, and did not preclude him from publicizing the source of funds. In fact, by that time the source of funds had been made public by the press and to the participants in the conference by Professor Safran. There are three problems associated with the handling of the conference and the contract:

1. Not disclosing the contract to the Dean as required by University policy.

2. Not disclosing the source of support to participants (as recommended by the Executive Committee).

3. Not channelling the contract through the University, which was clearly involved financially and as a sponsor.

From the standpoint of scholars here and elsewhere, and from the University's point of view, the most serious problem lies in the need to disclose the sources of support for research or conferences to all those who are involved and to the public. When the CIA is a sponsor, taking this step is mandatory under the Intelligence Agency Guidelines and, under accepted academic standards, it is essential for the protection of scholars who place their trust in us. The Middle Eastern Studies Association has expressed deep concern about this failure, focusing quite properly on the importance of full disclosure of research support, especially in cases where others are involved as participants. Fortunately, the conference did not take place before the source of funding was disclosed. Nevertheless, scholars have expressed to me their concern that it might have. For that reason, I feel the University owes an apology to the participants, to scholars in the field, and to the academic community at large. As the Dean of the Faculty in which the CMES resides, I offer that apology sincerely and with a determination to see that this type of problem will not arise again.

II. The Contract for Support of a Research Project on Saudi Arabia

In the summer of 1981, Professor Safran began negotiations with the CIA for support of a research project on Saudi Arabia that had been underway since 1978 and supported by various sources including the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rand Corporation. Early in the negotiation process, Professor Safran consulted about the treatment of possible CIA research funding as an individual rather than an institutional agreement with the then Director of the CMES, who was simultaneously serving as Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (editor's note: Professor of History Edward L. Keenan). In or around May of 1982, Professor Safran discussed the contract with the Associate Dean for Research in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Professor Safran was advised of the pertinent University and Faculty policies and was urged to disclose the contract to the Dean.

On May 12, 1982 Professor Safran signed a contract with the CIA for support of the research that resulted in his book, "Saudi Arabia: The Quest for Security." The period of performance specified by the contract was March 1, 1982 through February 28, 1983, and the amount of money involved was $107, 430.

On May 19, 1982 Professor Safran disclosed the existence and full text of the CIA contract in a letter to the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences (editor's note: Henry Rosovsky). In his letter, Professor Safran called attention to the provision requiring pre-publication review, one of the potentially controversial elements of the contract. As far as I have been able to determine, he received no response, nor was the President of the University informed as called for by the Intelligence Agency Guidelines. The review by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences was incomplete in two respects. First, the terms of the contract were not examined closely. Second, the contract was not reviewed to determine the level of institutional involvement and hence the applicability of the University's policies with respect to institutional grants and contracts. These are clearly administrative errors in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and not those of Professor Safran or the CMES.

Had it been determined at the time that the contract involved the institution, two provisions in it would have been at variance with University policies with respect to institutional contracts. One is a standard provision granting the CIA the right to review and approve the written output prior to publication. The second provision is a stipulation that the CIA will not be disclosed as a source of research support in subsequent published work. The first provision was qualified in a contract amendment indicating that because "the Government will not provide classified material for use in completing the research...[it] does not anticipate any delay in reaching an affirmative decision on any request for approval to publish." The amendment also obliged the Government to "complete its review within 30 days from receipt of any request to publish," and to give "specific written reasons for withholding approval" if it chose to deny publication. Thus, the right of pre-publication review and approval was retained. Professor Safran complied with both provisions by submitting his book to the CIA for pre-publication review, following which no charges were requested or made, and by not disclosing CIA support in his book. Professor Safran did inform his acquisitions editor at the Harvard University Press of the CIA support in a letter dated November 6, 1984, prior to the publication of the book.

The results of my review of the research contract are as follows:

1. Professor Safran followed the policies and guidelines with respect to disclosure of individual contracts in the case of the book contract. He cannot and should not be held responsible for the Faculty's failure to conduct a complete review and respond to the disclosure.