I think the serious point being made here is that the American people and the South African people have both been guilty of crimes against blacks. But there I think the resemblance ends. And even if the resemblance didn't end there, isn't it irrational to limit your moral concern only to those crimes which you have committed? These are the two arguments I've found to specialize the question of apartheid over the question of genocide. I'm left in admiration for President Bok's two open letters and in particular for his notion that the University has, not a moral neutrality, but a special mission that gives its own morals, and even its own politics to convey.

PETER LANGE:

Mr. President, it seems to me that in this debate, at least among those who have declared themselves to be in general agreement on the question of the singularity of South African repression, that there is one lesson that overrides all the others, which is the lesson of powerlessness. I have heard, and I think it is shared by many of us, even many of us who have signed the letter, the open letter which was submitted, that there is not a great deal which we can do in an immediate sense to change the character of the South African regime. Nye's long chain is a real long chain, and I think none of us, or least not I, would deny it. I would also not deny at the end of that long chain, as I think Nye also pointed out, there is an enormously evil regime. So we thrust around for morally correct options in face of the recognition of relative powerlessness. Never an easy position, at least if one takes one's morality as seriously as one takes one's powerlessness.

We seek a position, it seems to me, an option, if you want, an option for the University, which recognizes that morality is bound up in this case both with the ends and the values which we are pursuing, which have to do, as I'll come to in a moment, and with the means by which those ends are to be pursued. We do not get up here and say that we wish to clean our hands of the case, because we recognize that the means reflect on the moral stance which we take. We also seek morality, or an option which will express the morality, related both with the moral standing of the University as an educational institution, and with the effects which our position might have on blacks in South Africa.

Now, the position of the open letter which has been submitted to you, seeks, and I believe strongly does do so, to reconcile these concerns, these differing, balanced understanding of a moral position for the University to take in the face of the South African regime and our own investments of stocks in that regime, in companies with stock in that regime. It is a moderate position, it is not a position of washing one's hands, although some have characterized it as such, it is not a position of self-righteousness. It is a position which seeks to come to terms with the various dilemmas and difficulties of balancing which I sketched earlier. It is a moderate position and it is an articulated position--a position arguing for an articulated strategy which would provide the University with guidelines which are not only morally efficacious, but also at least politically efficacious within the bounds of our understanding of powerlessless, as I suggested at the beginning of my remarks.

Now, why is it such? Because it lays out a series of articulated, escalating steps to be taken in the face of the corporate investments of the University, a set of articulated, escalating steps, each one of which is intricately related both to the preceding and the following steps. And here I would like to return to a point which Prof. Hoffmann made in his remarks, and which I think is of fundamental importance, in the sense that it reflects both on the moral efficaciousness of our stance with respect to our own standing as an educational institution, and with our ability to affect, within the restraints of powerlessness, or relative powerlessless, the corporations.

If we proceed with a policy that does not make clear to the corporations that there are potential consequences to follow upon their failure to respond to earlier demands or positions taken by the University, if, in other words, at the end of our chain of articulated steps, there exists no exit, only a kind of crying in the wind, then we fail in the end, either to communicate our moral stance or to exercise what little power in the most efficacious way that we have in this situation.

PRESIDENT BOK:

I wonder, since we have only five minutes, if I might make two observations. One of them is that this meeting is, I hope, an opportunity to share just how frustrating and difficult a situation we confront, where we all share very deeply a sense of outrage against a whole set of practices which are deeply inhumane. But nonetheless, the situation is very difficult. One of the difficulties, of course, is that the ultimate step of divestment, to give up the threat of real penalty to a corporation, is not necessarily that at all. Unfortunately, various corporate executives have indicated to me that they would be delighted if people who don't like their policies would simply sell their stock, and get out of their hair at shareholders' meetings. But even here. I think, the notion that holding the threat of divestment over their heads will be a threat is an empirical proposition which perhaps we should try to check. It is by no means a clear one, on the basis of conversations I have had.

The last thing I would like to do simply not because I can vouch for it, not because I necessarily agree with it, because it is indeed a criticism of our policy, just to lay one more strand of complexity before you. I would like to quote from a letter that has just recently come from a man called Howard Shomer, who was formerly a dean of the Divinity School at Chicago and now is head of the Social Responsibility in Investments for the United Church Boards in the United Church of Christ. He says, he's writing to Tony Lewis of the New York Times, who as you know devoted two articles to this subject. He says, "I wonder if you have any information which we lack concerning the political and physical possibility of any foreign firm actually withdrawing its assets from the Republic of South Africa. On March 30, 1977, the South African Finance Minister stated in his budget speech to the Parliament that foreign controlled South African enterprises will in the future only be allowed to transfer profits to foreign countries out of profits earned in the preceding two years. This has been interpreted to me by the editor of the Financial Mail as meaning that any applicant for a license to export assets more than 24 months old may be authorized to do so only in the form of South African bonds, treasury or parastal, or security rands, both of which the world market commonly discounts at 25 to 40 per cent. Since the most recent two or three years have seen many deficits and limited profits in U.S. subsidiaries in South Africa, it would seem that a sizable share of the proceeds of any sale of assets there would be dealt with by the South African Foreign Assets Control officials as old profits requiring such a license. I understand that security rands are not currently legal tender in South Africa, and that the government bonds in question are likely to be of the 15 to 30 year category. If all this is accurate, it would seem that without drawing such attention to it as to depress foreign investor interest, the South African government has effectively rendered the withdrawal debate sterile. Even if a foreign company were to succeed in disposing of its assets in South Africa for a fair, rather than a forced sale price, translating them into loans to the South African government would hardly be an act of disengagement. Indeed, church stockholders who have led the proxy battle to stop U.S. bank loans to the South African government and state-controlled corporations, in the hypothetical case of their succeeding and persuading some company operating in the Republic of South Africa to sell its assets there, only to find it had to trade the proceeds for long-term South African bonds, would surely find themselves in an intellectually incoherent and morally untenable position. All this would appear to be true whether the purchaser of the U.S. or other foreign corporate subsidiary were a friend of apartheid or a resister. Since it is doubtful that any resister would care to acquire an operating company in South Africa at the present time, it would seem more likely that the acquirer would be a firm that could live with apartheid more comfortably than the seller. Obviously, the question would be pertinent in either case: What has the change in ownership accomplished for the liberation of the oppressed majority? If the answer has got to be nothing, or even less, how would the seller's soul be saved, a reference in your message to Pretoria too."

I don't read that as a personal statement at all, but simply because we've heard so many arguments on different sides, but many of them have to do with withdrawal. It seemed to me that statement from . . .at least, I was going to say, throws further light, increases the complexity of our situation.

I do want to express my appreciation to everyone who has spoken. I'm sure this will not be the last time we will speak. But I very much appreciate the spirit in which the discussion has gone on, and the way in which we have tried to think together about how we will approach a horrible situation, instead of simply castigating one another simply because we take different approaches to a common end. Being six o'clock. I think we should adjoin the meeting, unless there is some urgent business to come before us.