MARY NOLAN

In its January 1979 report the ACSR stated that Harvard would investigate the operations of corporations investing on South Africa on a case by case basis. Rather than initiating either information or action shareholder resolutions, Harvard would solicit information by less formal means. The presumed intent is to determine whether corporations are following "progressive labor practices," and whether such practices outweigh the support which corporations give to the apartheid regime. I will refrain from criticizing the cumbersomeness, slowness and ineffectiveness of such procedures. Instead, I wish to focus on what Harvard will find out, if it receives information comparable to that collected by other investigatory bodies. Specifically, I would like to discuss the findings of Sen. Dick Clark's Subcommittee on African

After an intensive investigation of the role and behavior of U.S. corporations in South Africa, an investigation conducted by research, questionnaires and public hearings, the Senate subcommittee determined

1. that the Sullivan principles were not being adhered to;

2. that even if they were, it would have little influence since less than 1 per cent of the black labor force was employed by U.S. corporations;

3. further, the subcommittee determined that U.S. banks and corporations were playing a vital role in maintaining and strengthening the South African apartheid regime by providing it with funds, advanced technology and productive capacity.

Harvard invests heavily in many of the corporations which play this major economic and political role in South Africa such as G.M., IBM, ITT, Exxon, Mobil and Raytheon. By retaining those investments, Harvard is taking a political unethical--stance. It is tying itself to powerful outside forces. It is not morally powerful outside forces. It is not morally neutral. Let me elaborate on these arguments.

The Sullivan principles call for 1) the integration of eating, comfort and work facilities; 2) equal and fair employment practices for all employees; 3) equal pay for equal work; 4) training programs to prepare blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs; 5) hiring blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions; 6) improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, education and recreation.

The Senate subcommittee sought information on the behavior of the over 300 firms investing in South Africa. Only 71 replied to the questionnaires--a most revealing fact in itself.

1. 43 companies had Equal Employment opportunity policies but most were not specific to South Africa. Moreover, 25 communicated these policies only verbally, casting doubt on their actual implementation.

2. Nearly 9000 of the 12,000 white employees in these firms received salaries, indicating skilled jobs. Only 1200 of the 8300 blacks received salaries.

3. 63 firms said they had equal pay for equal work policies, but 28 said they could not implement them due to the inexperience of black workers.

4. 25 firms, including such large and labor intensive operations as Ford, Firestone and Goodyear, paid their black workers at the Poverty Datum Line, a calculation of the minimum level necessary for survival, excluding rent and transportation.

5. No U.S. firms dealt with African trade unions.

6. The Senate subcommittee concluded that U.S. firms were not taking an aggressive role with the South African government on labor related issues. Few firms received fines or reprimands for violations of labor laws. Few firms asked the government for exemptions from certain laws. This raises, the report noted, serious questions about whether the corporations are enforcing their EEO policies, carrying out training programs or conducting business in a manner which does not perpetuate or strengthen the apartheid system.