IN THE DAY AFTER the Italian elections, the Roman newspaper of the right, II Popolo, came out with banner headlines: "Victory for the Christian Democrats." The same edition of Paese Sera, a leftist paper, was headed: "Communists Advance." Clearly, the "Italian situation" remains unresolved.

The elections of June 20 and 21 left the Christian Democrats (DC) with about 39 per cent of the vote in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (an increase of some 3.5 per cent over their showing in the regional elections of 1975). The Communists, on the other hand, registered a gain of about 2.5 per cent over their showing in the 1975 elections, thus obtaining roughly 34 per cent of the vote in both parts of Parliament. The losers were the smaller parties of both right and center-left: the Christian Democrats apparently gained at the expense of the neofascists (MSI) and of their allies in the "center" (the Republicans and Liberals), while the vote of the left seems to have shifted from the Socialists to the Communists. The resultant bipolarization will hardly contribute to the stability or progress of Italy. The new government will not have the confidence of the electorate--whether (after the political manuevering presently occurring) that government turns out to be one of the DC alone, another coalition of the "center-left," or the "Historic Compromise," a government of DC and the Communists (PCI). A compromise would probably be the most representative of the mood of the country but, given the Byzantine mechanics of Italian politics, it is the least likely.

THE ELECTIONS WERE undoubtedly, as most commentators have been saying, the most crucial to Italy's future since 1948. It was in that year that the Christian Democrats, with a plurality of 48.5 per cent of the vote, established themselves as the party that would dominate the Italian political scene. Since 1948 the DC's hegemony has been uninterruptedly self-perpetuated through a political mechanism that, even today, is the most static in Europe.

But below the surface things have been changing with increasing rapidity, as the overall trend to the left and the growing rift between left and right in these elections demonstrates. The DC-headed coalitions of the "centro-sinistra" (center-left)--including the Christian Democrats and one or more of the smaller parties (Socialist, Social Democratic, or Republican)--have shown themselves increasingly unable to cope with Italy's economic problems over the past few years. The rapid post-war industrialization of the country and the accompanying rise in the standard of living seem, in retrospect, to have peaked in 1969. Since then, the DC has been unwilling to advocate restriction and reform of government spending--a policy that would damage the interests of petty bureaucrats and multinational corporations. Nor has the party developed a coherent policy of "austerity," which might include, for example, taxes on luxury goods. In short, the DC has been incapable of presenting a concrete and effective platform to re-establish economic stability and redistribute the benefits of Italy's "economic miracle" on a more equitable basis.

In the prevailing situation of mismanagement and corruption, the Communist party (PCI), traditionally the extra-parliamentary opposition, presented itself as the party capable of formulating and putting into practice a program of economic austerity that is the only cure for Italy's unemployment and inflation (20 per cent, according to recent figures). During the recent election campaigns, the PCI backed a program of much-needed social reforms: new hospitals and schools, more housing, and a crackdown on the wealthy industrialists who habitually evade their income tax. Perhaps most important, the PCI offered an effective alternative to the politics of corruption and scandal that have become the trademark of the DC.

The Communists raised one important question during the campaign: can Italy's economic and social crisis be resolved without the recognized participation and cooperation of the 34 per cent of the voting population that the Communists represent? And in fact, the PCI is and has been for some time represented on every parliamentary committee, and has played a large part in drafting and passing progressive legislation, such as the divorce bill and the proposed democratization of the armed forces. On the regional and municipal levels the PCI--who now govern all of the major cities of mainland Italy except Rome--have proved themselves to be comparatively honest and efficient administrators. What was contested during these elections was, in one sense, merely a formality, an admission of a change in the balance of power which has in reality already occurred, a change that has been gradually evolving since the workers' strikes in the "hot autumn" of 1969.

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS responded by polarizing the situation. The DC, throughout the campaign, flatly rejected the possibility of any coalition which involved the PCI, and the party secretary, Zaccagnini, went so far as to state that "not to confirm the DC as the indispensable governing party would severely compromise the future of democracy in Italy." This line of attack was supported by the Vatican (over the protests of leftist Catholics, including many of the clergy) and favored by the Ford administration (though not by US Embassy Press Attache William Lenderking, transferred to Bangkok because he advocated a more flexible policy with regard to the Communists).

Using a strategy all-too-familiar to post-Watergate America, the DC delayed investigation of the Lockheed scandal, in which several top Christian Democrats were implicated, until after the elections. The case of neofascist parliamentarian Sandro Saccuccu, who is awaiting extradition in London on charges of shooting a Communist at a street rally, was also postponed until after the elections--but Saccucci, who was reelected to Parliament, may now be able to obtain immunity from prosecution.

In their efforts to portray the Communists as red devils, the DC employed not only the politics of the coverup, but the politics of terror. Recent investigations have indicated that the escalating series of unexplained bombings and attacks (beginning in late 1969--suspiciously soon after the strikes--with the explosion in Piazza Fontana in Milan, including bombings of trains in the summer of 1974, and most recently, the killing of a state prosecutor in Genoa) all of which the government attributed to extremist groups of the left, may actually have been planned by the Italian secret service.

Trying to hold on to power at any price, the DC portrayed the left as a united and anti-democratic front, with whom there could be no "historic compromise." Ironically, the result of their attitude seems to have been a hitherto-unseen unity among the PCI and the smaller parties of the left, from the workers movement, Lotta Continua, to the intellectual leftists of the Partito Radicale, and even including the Socialists, the habitual enemies of the PCI.

The reorientation of the power base, whereby the Socialists, once to the left, are now, though reduced in power, at the center of the Italian political balance, casts the PCI as the "true heirs of Italian socialism," as Lelio Basso, one of the most respected Marxist senators in the country, sees them. Judging by their continued efforts to separate themselves from the Soviet aegis, looking at their evolving ideology of Marxism-as-practicable-in-Italy, this is a role the Communists are glad to play, though they may never officially admit it.

The visible result has been not only more collaboration between the PCI and other parties, but also less rhetoric and more realistic proposals from the Communists and a considered and carefully articulated platform. As they acquired respectability in the eyes of the Italian electorate, the PCI seems to have acquired a sense of responsibility. Should they prove unable to fulfill the promises that gained them support, they now have something to lose.

THAT SORT OF GOVERNMENT will now emerge, whether the Communists will be allowed to officially assume some of the responsibility of government, remains to be seen. What is immediately apparent from the election results is that Italy is becoming increasingly split between those who, as "haves," defend the status quo, and those who, as "have-nots," want change. Looking at the tactics of this election campaign, and at the views expressed in its course, this schism seems to have been desired and for the most part created by the party in power, the DC. The question to be answered by both of the "sides" is: can the splitbe overcome in practice, can representatives of all of Italian society work together to attempt to solve some of Italy's economic and social crises? The alternatives in this country where weak and unjust government has historically been countered with alternative systems of "justice" such as the Mafia, or fascism, are frightening.