So the PC remains anathema for U.S. foreign policy. It promises to continue that way as long as Secretary Kissinger remains in office, since his obdurate view of PC "unacceptability" shows no signs of relaxing. What will the administration do, assuming it's still around next year, when the PC wins its expected majority?

Several options are open. There's always the interventionist approach: covert operations, Chile-style, via the CIA. American citizens may dismiss this possibility, treating Chile as an aberration which could not be repeated in western Europe. But the Italians themselves fear this possibility more than any other and in self-defense have published all the names of top-level CIA agents in Italy.

Blown covers for their CIA agents provides one reason why the U.S. should not pursue this angle. In addition to this tactical disadvantage, there are other reasons for avoiding intervention. Covert CIA operations would not at this point be acceptable to U.S. allies in Europe. CIA intervention would certainly alienate most pro-western forces in Italy, leaving the U.S. with few allies. Finally, there is no right-wing military establishment which could succeed a possible Communist government. Neo-fascism is a possibility, but only at the cost of civil war. Due to all their governmental instability and endless political crises, post-war Italian politics has given the nation a strong pluralistic tradition, and a great respect for civil liberties.

More plausible than direct intervention, since anti-CIA feeling runs high in the U.S. as well, is a policy of making life difficult for any government that included the PC. Economic pressures could be applied along with withdrawal of international credits, and in Italy's current economic crisis, these measures could have decisive effects. Or the U.S. could oppose Italian participation in NATO and the Common Market.

But the most unfortunate aspect of U.S. policy toward Italy is that it is counter-productive even on its own terms. As Professor Peter Lange argues in an article in the current issue of "Foreign Policy," the "oppose at all costs," anti-PC feeling in the State Department works against U.S. interests. Because though U.S. opposition might at first keep the PC out of the government, it would not encourage reform in the DC. After thirty years of rule a stint in the opposition may well be what the DC needs to recover its health. And of all the major parties, only a reformed DC stands as a possible alternative to the PC. Lange adds that dogged U.S. opposition to the PC may force the party to seek alliances elsewhere, like Moscow, something neither the PC not the U.S. regards as a favorable alternative.

A MORE SENSIBLE foreign policy toward the PC includes--or rather should start with--some constructive dialogue. The State Department should open its doors to members of the PC who wish to come to this country to lecture or talk with State Department officials. Rudeness and denial of the PC's existence hinders, rather than advances, foreign relations. In addition, a more lenient attitude towards the "historic compromise" would be wise. Such a change in attitude could act as a signal of goodwill so that an alliance could begin on a basis of friendship and trust. In the long run, such an alliance would benefit the U.S., since cooperation with the PC would ensure a stronger Italy. A stronger Italy, in turn, would help promote a stronger Western Europe, a central U.S. foreign policy objective. But above all, the CIA must be kept clear of U.S.-Italian relations. The agency is fast becoming an Italian national joke, and every time more CIA actions become public knowledge, relations are strained even more between the two countries.

While such a policy change seems unlikely under the present steadfastly anti-Communist administration, it seems possible that the election year may produce a constructive approach, after, of course, the Republican nomination is settled. The U.S. needs a policy that understands and accepts rather than fears Italian Communism. But if the U.S. fails to develop such a policy, the imminent ascension of the PC to power may precipitate a sharp collision between Italy and the U.S.