From Terrill's point of view, the revolution has definitely been accomplished and Mao is no longer essential, so any attempt at replacement would be superfluous. "They do not need nor would they tolerate an individual with the bold originality of Mao." Terrill singles out ideology as the dynamic aspect of Mao's rule, rather than charisma, and when you're dealing with such a factor, an individual just isn't crucial.

Schwartz hews to a sharply different analysis of Mao's role. In his opinion, Mao the man has steadily merged with Maoist ideology, especially in the past few years. Even if he was ill and relatively inactive towards the end of his life, Schwartz says Mao's presence was influential. "I don't think he was ever a leader interested in the details or mechanics of government. Yet all he had to do was say something and it would come down with a crash, he says. Schwartz foresees some hardship in establishing the Chinese Communist Party as an institutional entity, a central focus, with the find of legitimacy that its chairman had. And although he sees factions in the leadership compromising now, because of anxiety over splintering within the government, Schwartz feels the party still must assert itself as an independent entity.

Foreign analysts have been intrigued by the selection of Mao's successor almost since the Republic's founding, and many who seemed primed for the position--like Teng Hsiaoping--have abruptly fallen by the wayside. Hofheinz thinks Mao was also highly concerned with succession in his last year. Nonetheless, he says, Mao tried to undermine any institutionalized process of succession. He stood out above everyone else and tended to create anonymity at the level below him. Hofheinz hazards that "there are those who will try to preserve this anonymity using collective leadership in the name of Chairman Mao to justify their position, which will create a very unstable situation." Another plausible scenario, he says, is that individuals tied to Mao "will try to ride out the wave of his popularity--his wife would be an obvious beneficiary."

Hofheinz shares Schwartz's impression that the country has become accustomed to Mao's "spirit" or "guidance" and he posits that the society will depend on something akin to this "guiding light" to continue functioning as it has been. This doesn't mean all-out struggles must continue, Hofheinz says: "The spiritual factor doesn't have to do-with politics; it's a psychological factor." He believes that worries over China's precarious economic situation will impose a temporary lull on spiritual exhortation. But even in the later ranges of history he says, "swings will probably not be so violent as they were when Mao was at the helm. We're going to have many hands at the tiller now; so turns will take longer to develop, will be more obviously done, and they will be telegraphed in advance."

The general consensus among Harvard's Sinologists is that China is moving into a period of continued experimentation. There won't be any new quotations from Mao Tse-tung to tide the country over rough patches, and those now wielding the well-worn aphorisms of the past may imbue them with distorted meanings. The most curious response to Mao's death may come from China's younger generation, which has never known another leader or system or experienced the turmoil and deprivation endured by Chinese in the era of imperialism and during the socialist revolutions--the same generation that, in other nations, has often stood in awe of Mao Tse-tung.

'One spark can set fire to the whole plain.' --Calligraphy by Mao Tse-tung.