The differences between the two unions go deeper than what is written on the paper of the contracts. Fundamental political and organizational characteristics distinguish the UFW from the Teamsters. The UFW is a progressive, democratic union. The election of ranch committees guarantees that the union is controlled by local workers. The broader stricture of the union, determined by a constitutional convention held in 1973, was designed by workers to stay open and responsive to their needs. The UFW exists as part of a movement against racial oppression. The workers, largely Chicano, Filipino, black and Asia, are struggling against the conditions that have kept them in poverty for centuries. The elected governing board of the Union is made up of five Chicanos, two Filipinos, one black and one Jew, in reflection of the racial composition of the membership. Through the union, the unorganized are organizing themselves to challenge the entrenched interests of agribusiness, which has put down all labor movement in the past. The changes introduced by the union are allowing more and more workers to exert control over their working conditions.
The Teamsters Unions is responsive to the needs of the growers, not the farm workers. The Teamsters is run from above through bureaucratic appointments. David Castro, the president of the only existing Teamster local of farm workers (and presently earning $500 per week), was appointed without any election. He argues, "Suppose we had an election and it was stacked and I lost. To be very honest, I have to make sure the local is going to make it" (New York Times, November 11, 1974), Workers say that only the lowest level of the hierarchy has contact with them. As one lettuce cutter working under teamster contract said. "The Teamsters only come to the fields one time a month to sign up people. They never talk to the people or try to help them out" (Fresno Bee, September 18, 1974).
The men who control the Teamsters follow blatantly racist policies. Einar Mohn, president of the Western Conference of Teamsters in 1973, said. "It will be a couple of years before they can start having membership meetings, before we can use the farm workers' ideas in the union...I'm not sure how effective a union can be when it is composed of Mexican-Americans...as jobs become more attractive to whites, then we can build a union that can have a structure and that can negotiate with strength and have membership participation" (Los Angeles Times, April 28, 1973). Recently, the Teamsters shifted the leadership of their single farm workers' local to white people, away from the Mexican-Americans who organized it.
Most of the farm workers who work under Teamster contracts do so out of economic necessity, not free choice. Many, finding the contract unenforced, have refused to pay dues. When Frank Fitzsimmons, president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, went to speak in Salinas. Calif... in June 1974. "Teamster" lettuce workers left the fields to picket his conference. When Cesar Chavez went to Salinas five days later, 3500 "Teamster" lettuce workers went to a UFW rally.
The role of the Teamsters in agriculture has consistently been one of complicity with the growers. In particular, the way the Teamsters and Gallo operated in the summer of 1973 was a classic case of the signing of a "sweetheart" contract. A New York Times editorial summarized these events by saying that "taking advantage of the absence of any federal or state laws requiring union elections to determine the wishes of farm laborers. Gallo threw out the Chavez group and signed a four-year agreements with the Teamsters" (New York times. Sept. 18. 1973).
When Gallo announced the beginning of negotiation with the Teamster above 80 per cent of the Gallo workers went out on strike. The response of the corporation was to bring in strike-breakers, and to sign a "sweetheart" contract with the Teamsters after a single bargaining session. In September of 1973, Gallo workers met at UFW headquarters and decided to initiate the boycott of Gallo products.
Recently the United Farm Workers boycott campaign has generated a great deal of controversy. The Gallo distributors and liquor stores supporting Gallo insist that the farm workers struggle is a jurisdictional dispute between two unions and that liquor stores have nothing to do with it. It should be clear that more is at stake than a simple tight between unions. An examination of the political and economic factors involved in the unionization drive should clarity the role of the national boycott campaign in promoting a farm workers victory.
California agriculture is dominated by large monopolistic corporations which historically have had ties to conservative politicians, law enforcement agencies, and the courts E & J Gallo Winery fits right into this group. Although most of the company's production, sales and profit statistics are kept secret by the management, it is known that the company produces about one-third of all wine sold in this country. Gallo's pre-tax profits in 1971 reached $35 to $40 million, according to the Nov. 27 1972, issue of Time. Gallo's economic strength makes it possible for the company to recruit and transport strike breakers, to conduct large0scale public relations campaigns, to bear the costs of temporary production disruption due to strikes and to involve itself in drawn-out court cases. These are all expensive operations which companies with less market control and lower profits could not afford.
Recognition of the United Farm Workers union by Gallo Wineries would run counter to the company's interests and would cut into profits, both in the short run (through union demands for higher wages, pensions and benefits) and in the long run (through union demands for employment security, higher health and safety standards and increased worker control over hiring, firing and speed of work). Therefore, Gallo wineries is just acting in its own self-interest--no amount of pleading can convince them that recognition of the UFW is the "right" thing to do. The only way for the farm workers to win any of their basic rights is to put economic and political pressure on the company.
In response to Gallo's effort to crush the UFW, the union has called for a national boycott of Gallo wine.
The Harvard-Radcliffe Support Committee supports the boycott of Gallo wines for three main reasons. First, we believe that all workers have a right to choose their own union in free election. Second, we feel that all evidence points to the fact that the UFW is the farm workers' choice. Third, we believe that farm workers should be supported in their-struggle against bad working conditions, poor material benefits, and racism. We have gone to stores in the Harvard Square area, asking them to stop selling Gallo wine, and all have agreed except the Harvard provision Co. The boycott can only be effective if the stores cooperate; it is impossible to picket against the wine 24 hours a day. Since it is the sores that profit from the sale of Gallo wine, they must make the decision to stop selling it, and when they refuse, it is our job to reach their customers, so that together, we can put economic pressure on the store. The clearest evidence of the kind of support we have gained from customers for the farm workers' struggle is the fact that Harvard Pro. along with Avenue Liquor Mart, and Pappas, the local Gallo distributor, attempted to get a court injunction against the picketing, which they claim has resulted in a large loss of sales.
Avenue Liquors spent $4000 in pursuing the injunction; Harvard Pro spent about the same. To those who suggest that the poor liquor stores are caught in the middle of a dispute between unions we must ask the question, how poor are the stores that can afford to spend thousands of dollars on legal fees to obtain an injunction against picketing? Businessmen have many ways to put economic pressure on us, as consumers, but boycotting stores is the only legal economic weapon consumers have against businesses.