KISSINGER: First, senator, you have to remember that when a crisis occurs, there is total confusion even in the White House Though most people would expect that intelligence information puts one ahead of the information curve, you can generally assume that in the middle of a crisis the newspaper reports might be slightly ahead of the intelligence information. So the first thing we confronted, whenever it was, Tuesday morning or Wednesday morning...

McGEE: Tuesday morning.

KISSINGER: Tuesday morning was total confusion as to what was really going on down there, and who was doing what to whom.

The decision to maintain neutrality, or whatever its significance is, was taken at a meeting of what is called the Washington Special Actions Group--I will be damned if I can remember how it got that name, it happened four years ago--which meets automatically whenever there is a crisis. It is chaired by me and it has the deputy secretaries from all of the departments. Our decision, frankly, was sort of a holding decision until we could see more clearly. The only complete decision we made was to turn our fleet around and move it north so it would not be within--it was intended to be about 150 miles from the Chilean coast but then came around at the Falkland Islands.

We took the decision that we would not say anything that indicated either support or opposition--that we would avoid what we had done in Brazil in 1963 where we rushed out by recognizing the government. We instructed the ambassador that he could not establish diplomatic contact and that if he were approached he would send his military attaches to maintain the contact.

Now, then, when we make these decisions, they tend to get very literally applied, so everyone was afraid even to express sorrow at the personal fate of Allende, which we rectified the next morning. But that decision would have been taken in the Washington Special Actions Group and approved by the president.

McGEE: Is the Washington Special Actions Group the group of State that works out the concrete that is sometimes, in the press in this case, alluded to as the task force on Chile?

KISSINGER: No; the Washington Special Actions Group generally operates in an emergency. It meets almost automatically in an emergency. Then there would be a task force headed by the Department details. The Washington Special Actions Group might say "we will take a hands-off policy for 24 hours or 48 hours. We have to get an analysis of what sort of proposals have been made."

In this case we had to find out, for example, what supplies were going into Chile, so that it did not look as if we were suddenly pouring in supplies. We had to shop around to various departments to find whether in the routine delivery of existing programs, something might be planned for those two or three days that would create problems. That sort of thing. We would give the instruction and then the task force on Chile would work out the concrete details. We have got them right now working on a study of what the various dimensions of humanitarian and other assistance might be, and at the same time we are having them study what the various expropriation issues are, becuase we do not want to be hit by ten companies suddenly filing claims for expropriated property and making it look at though this whole exercise was designed by us in order to get compensation for expropriation, although that is one of our long-term objectives.

This is just to give you a feel of how we operate.

McGEE: [U.S.] Ambassador [to Chile] Davis was home the weekend before. There are those who jumped to the conclusion that there must be a cause and effect relationship.

KISSINGER: I can explain to you exactly how that happened. In fact, if it proves anything it proves the opposite. When I was nominated I called back--among the first group that is--ambassadors whom I knew well and trusted, like Ambassador Sullivan. I asked each of them to tell me in each area of the world those ambassadors whom they liked, whom they thought most highly of, so that they could advise me (a) about the area, and (b) about personnel in the department that they might have met in the area. Ambassador Davis was on two lists that were given to me. I had only met him fleetingly, and for all practical purposes I did not know him. [Deleted.]

When I mentioned his name I was told there was turmoil in Chile. I then asked the department to instruct Ambassador Davis to come back in whatever 48-hour period he thought was least likely to cause difficulty, and he himself chose that weekend.

We did talk about the situation in Chile for about five minutes. I asked him about coup reports. He said they were endemic, and I said, "Just make sure none of our embassy personnel has anything to do directly or indirectly with any of the plotters, if there are plotters, in response to any approaches." He said he had given those instructions. There was no talk about the coup except the rumor that had been around for weeks and months.

McGEE: As you listen to some of the comments here this morning, there is a suggestion that the CIA has been deeply involved in Chilean affairs over a period of time in one way or another. This came out in the ITT hearings, for example. Was the CIA deeply involved at this time?