Lindzey correctly identifies the conflict at Harvard between pure research and practical application, but this does not invalidate the Boulder model. Despite the problems of combining research and practice at Harvard, it is still vital for a good abnormal personality psychologist to have a solid command of both. Consequently, it is important for an abnormal personality program to offer training in both theory and practice. The clinical psychology program was the victim of a squeeze between research and professional training. The conflicting and arbitrary bureaucratic demands of the University on one side and of the APA and the NIMH on the other ignored the basic good sense of the Boulder ideal.

However, the end of the Social Relations Department's formal involvement in clinical psychology did not end the need for such a program. In 1967, President Pusey appointed a committee to find a way to salvage clinical psychology in some form in the University. The report of the President's Committee on Training in Clinical Psychology at Harvard University, written mainly by Robert W. White '25, professor of Psychology, proposed the creation of a new graduate program in Clinical Psychology and Public Practice (CPPP, or CP3).

CP3 was planned as a cooperative venture among four faculties: the Social Relations departments of the faculties of Education, Medicine, Divinity, and Arts and Sciences. The interfaculty arrangement had two purposes. First, it was hoped it would offset the arts and sciences emphasis on research, and second, it was supposed to make clinical psychology more responsive to the needs of so many people for psychological help.

The second purpose distinguished CP3 from traditional clinical training programs, including Harvard's old program. White wanted CP3 to train people to provide mental health care to the majority of Americans who cannot afford the time and expense of one-to-one psychotherapy. He saw CP3 graduates as workers and administrators in public clinical settings, such as community mental health centers, mental hospitals, schools, and churches. He wrote in his report, "Our proposals contain a radical change of emphasis in training, with the aim of preparing men and women to provide for previously neglected populations, to meet new expectations, to assume new responsibilities, and, above all, to initiate new ways of serving mental health needs."

CP3 got under way in Fall 1969. The program was beset with serious problems from the very beginning. First, teachers and students soon developed two, very different definitions of public clinical psychology. Some stuck to White's goal of learning to provide mental health care in traditional clinical settings. Others felt that this sort of work just patched up the more seriously damaged psychological victims of institutions throughout society which failed to meet human needs. The concerns of this wing of CP3 went beyond just schools and hospitals to include the effects of all kinds of institutions on individuals: police departments, families, neighborhoods, the media. This group wanted to study, propose, and apply preventive methods to the problem of making all types of social institutions more responsive to the people they serve.

Unavoidably, these conceptual differences created some tension in CP3. It was, however, a fruitful tension. Edwin N. Barker, associate professor in the School of Education and a teacher in CP3, said, "The lack of intellectual coherence causes anxiety, ambiguity and confusion. This is a good learning environment, but it creates problems. These problems are inevitable in trying to create a new field."

Ultimately, the more serious problems were bureaucratic. Once again it took a long time to find a person to lead the program; and unfortunately, the man chosen, Dr. Richard R. Rowe, then associate dean for Administration of the School of Education, had neither the academic stature nor the political clout necessary to build a new program at Harvard. Lacking an initial financial commitment to CP3 from any of the four faculties, Rowe was forced to play the role of a beggar. Although he did get the money, the fact that he had to go hat in hand to each of the four faculties meant that the power remained with the deans. CP3 also lacked a spokesman to argue for greater support in each of the participating faculties.

Furthermore, teachers and faculty administrations disagreed on the title of the degree to be awarded to CP3 graduates. The dispute over whether to grant a Ph.D. or an Ed.D. revived the old conflict between the relative importance of research and practical applications.

In general, the four participating schools did not make a strong and shared commitment to CP3. As Paul N. Ylvisaker, dean of the School of Education says, "Ironically, as CP3 achieved four-school status, it became isolated from all four schools." The crowning blow was a bitter dispute between students and teachers over the amount of power students should have in making policy.

In order to resolve the host of problems plaguing CP3, Rowe finally requested that the review by an ad hoc committee which was scheduled for 1974 be held instead in Fall 1972. After an intensive study of CP3 the committee recommended in its report to President Bok that the University either increase its commitment to the program and restructure it by placing it in one school with interdisciplinary ties, or drop the program altogether. Unexpectedly, Bok chose to drop it. Unwilling to increase University support for an historically unstable program, Bok placed a moratorium on admissions to CP3, effectively killing it.

Regardless of the merits and flaws of the conflicting visions and administrative structure of CP3, the fact remains that its passing ends clinical psychology at Harvard, whether it be the traditional kind taught in the old program in the Social Relations Department, White's brand of clinical psychology in public settings, or the more recent "preventive" approach of changing institutions.

The essential truth of the Boulder model, that research and clinical experience in abnormal psychology go hand in hand, is still valid. But administrative failure, combined with a powerful research bias, has sabotaged every effort to integrate theory and practice in abnormal personality study at Harvard. Once again clinical psychology at Harvard is dead. Yet the need so clearly identified by the Boulder model remains.