The first Modigliani correlation, that between opposition to disengagement and the interventionist spirit, applies to Vietnam as well as Korea. On the basis of his findings, Modigliani claims that the interventionism so noticeably at work in the early 50's is still a strong influence on the Vietnam opinions of the upper classes.

But the trust-distrust factor as formulated for Korea cannot possibly lie behind the uniformly distributed preference for escalation in Vietnam. Those Korean days were rife with rumors of Communist infiltration into the government; hence, distrust of government could easily focus on the "soft on Communism" issue, and from here it was a logical step to assume that escalation in military activity was the proper measure, simply because an ambivalent government was unwilling to take it.

By contrast, our present distrust of Washington centers around such issues as the discovery of the "credibility gap", not the Red scare; it is difficult to see how preference for escalation could be associated with a disbelief in government casualty figures and progress reports. This fact leaves Professor Modigliani at a loss; he implies we must hold our breath till direct empirical evaluation of the Vietnam trust-distrust factor is possible. In the meantime, at least one interpretation deserves investigation.

IV

THERE can be little doubt that during the Korean War, administration distrust was essentially a manifestation of anti-Communist sentiment. This feeling was sufficiently strong to render any government action suspect. In the case of Vietnam, however, the anti-Communist component appears negligible; the credibility gap controversy seems to be a product of sheer indignation on the part of the public, without any ideological underpinnings.

But one must remember that this gap is itself nothing new. Americans have traditionally harbored a distinct suspicion of Washington politicians, their high-handed ways and high-flown rhetoric; the strength of populist movements throughout American history attests to this fact.

What is unique to this particular "credibility gap," not the Red scare; extraordinary stridency of public reaction to it, is that it comes during a time when this country is locked in combat with its mortal enemy--Communism. In other words, the present controversy is primarily due not to the revelation of the gap itself, but to the revelation that government deceptions serve to cover up Communist encroachment which might eventually pose a threat to an unaware public. And this supposed threat need not be solely military--the very thought, for example, of such a defiantly anti-American ideology triumphing over American will is enough to pique some people to the point of rebellion.

THIS KIND of distrust is very often associated with the clamor for escalation, just as it was in Korea. The widespread cry "Let the military run its war" is an example of this, reflecting both sharp distrust of government war efforts, and acceptance of escalation as a proper means to attain victory. The very fact that the possible victory here is a victory over Communism strengthens the propensity to favor escalation.

It is reasonable, then, to attribute the current uniform distribution of escalatory preference among the populace to a similarly uniform distribution of distrust, with anti-Communism the catalyst and link between the two.

But is the anti-Communism which underlies distrust of the same quality in the lower SES groups as in the higher ones? It cannot be if we go by Modigliani's findings, for the top SES sectors strongly oppose disengagement from Vietnam, while the bottom segments quite clearly do not.

THIS disparity can best be interpreted to mean that anti-Communism in the lower end of the socio-economic scale is by and large not translatable into political or military goals. Typically, this antipathy is virulent but not buttressed by ideology or material interests; lower-class anti-Communists decry the government's softness on Communism or its deceptive portrayal of battlefield progress, but rarely do they make the positive commitment to keep the world safe for America's brand of democracy. Generally disenfranchised from the prosperity of America, they possess no sense of noblesse oblige. Often alienated and debased, they have no sacred national image to protect. Their own chances for economic advancement usually slim, they see no logic in spilling blood over Guatemalan bananas or Southeast Asian oil. Internationalism is to these people simply a giant waste of lives, time, money, and effort--all of which could be better utilized, they reason, in their own back yards.

V

GIVEN the absence of those factors which motivate government officials and upper classes to support military interventions with remarkable regularity, what forces do contribute to the strong anti-Communist tendencies among many of the poor and uneducated? Clearly there is some justification to the conclusion of Seymour Martin Lipset and others that there exists in lower strata a general psychological predisposition to hostility and intolerance, which is often vented upon Communists and suspected Communists.

But this finding touches only the surface of the problem. Hatred and narrow-mindedness are not first causes; the question becomes: what causes them? Psychiatrist Robert Coles of Harvard has spent more than a decade attempting to answer the same type of question. He remarks:

"In no time confusion and outrage can turn to hate; and hate directed at people who are familiar or highly visible is easier than hate turned upon a whole social and economic system, and those who benefit handsomely from it. So the worker I quoted above shouts loudest at blacks when he is most angry at those 'vested interests' he keeps on mentioning--and not necessarily because his 'personality' is rigid or 'authoritarian'."