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An End to a Beginning?

Commentary

A tremendous war machine was then set up against the Viet Cong. At first the struggle was conduced by simple means: concentration camps....

Lacouture added that on May 6, 1959, Diem passed a law which after three days gave military tribunals the power to execute anyone accused of being a "coinstigator" of "attempts against the security of the state."

Whereas President Nixon spoke of the need to safeguard the individual rights of the Indochinese in his October 11 plan, his administration was not concerned that the removal of civilians on their own "free will" from northernmost to southernmost South Vietnam--which began in late October--would hinder a positive response from Hanoi to his peace plan. The relocation project grew to impressive dimensions in early January. On January 13 the PRG charged that the Saigon government's plan to relocate one million civilians would create a free-fire-zone in northernmost South Vietnam in which the U.S. could use tactical nuclear weapons. Peking and Hanoi have also expressed concern over relocation.

Another serious problem with the U.S. withdrawal proposal of October 11 is it does not firmly prohibit the reintroduction of American forces into Vietnam or the surrounding area. sAs Secretary Rogers told the editors on January 27, "We have a defense treaty with Thailand, the SEATO treaty, and Thailand is not involved in the war as Cambodia and Laos are. So we would expect that we would, at least for the short run, continue to have some Americans in Thailand. But that doesn't affect the settlement in Indochina..."

In recent days U.S. officials have indicated that to counter the upcoming communist offensive, two aircraft carriers are on their way to the Vietnamese coast, and one squadron of F4 Phantom bombers and two squadrons of B52s are en route to bases in Thailand.

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On April 9, 1971, General R. David, deputy commander of the Marine Corps, said that in case U.S. troops in South Vietnam were seriously endangered, Marine units on board ships off the coast of Vietnam would land in thirty minutes, and the Third Division of Marines would arrive by airlift from Okinawa in five hours.

The return of so much airpower to the Indochina battle-field hides the fact that the Nixon Administration does not really fear that Hanoi and the PRG can do much damage to the Thieu regime during Tet, the lunar new year. When questioned about the situation a highly placed official appeared to hope that Hanoi would expend all its energies during Tet on the theory that its whole military apparatus would be destroyed. During the next four years that Hanoi would require to rebuild its forces, the 'force of reason' and a decrease in Russian and Chinese aid would convince Hanoi to negotiate a settlement. The official also doubted that during this year's Tet offensive the village infrastructure of the Thieu regime would topple as it did in 1968.

Whatever happens during the present dry season fighting, it is unlikely that either side will achieve permanent tactical superiority over the other. At present there is no sign that a negotiated settlement is in the offing, but indecisive fighting and continued unwillingness on the part of Hanoi to release U.S. prisoners of war will make an eventual political accord unavoidable.

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