The incident did more than reveal the inadequacy of Ambassadorial verification procedures. No disciplinary action was taken against the CIA men responsible. Caught between powerful pressure groups, Sullivan was unable to exert full control over the air war.
Sap Nao and similar incidents led to a good deal of friction between the CIA and the Project 404 photo reconnaissance teams in Vientiane. In September 1968, CIA pressure finally resulted in the removal of the reconnaissance group down to Udorn, Thailand. Its departure marked the end of independent verification by the Embassy of strikes against targets it had approved.
November 1968 marked the beginning of the end of the restricted strike policy. As bombers began to pour into Laos, limited targeting and strike control became almost impossible.
The departure of Ambassador Sullivan five months later removed most of the remaining limitations on civilian raids. His replacement, G. McMurtrie Godley III, soon allied himself with those urging a wider bombing campaign. Arriving at the end of a dry season in which the communists had made greater gains than ever before, Godley also felt that operational efficiency demanded closer working relations with the military and CIA.
An American official intimately concerned with the bombing recently explained the change: "Sullivan was constantly on the outs with the Air Force. Oftentimes he'd have to go all the way to Washington to do what he wanted. But under Godley, things are much smoother. Everything is worked out here. Basically, he allows them to do what they want on the 'Trail' and in return he gets the aircraft he wants elsewhere. His requests have top priority now."
Godley's tenure has seen a meeting of minds between the Embassy, Air Force and CIA. All are in agreement on the necessity of a widened air war.
At this point, target selection within Laos rests almost entirely with the CIA. Based on its own photo interpretation team and ground observers operating behind or near enemy lines, the CIA puts up targets for Embassy approval. These requests are handled by a junior Foreign Service Officer, who lacks both formal training in photo interpretation and independent means of verification. Embassy authorization of suggested targets has become largely pro forma.
With the abolition of weekly target meetings, the Air Force has acquired a greater degree of control over the air war. Weekly "frags" (strike schedules) are no longer the result of heated controversy. They are prepared by the Air Force from a large list of approved targets, based on its own priorities and CIA recommendations.
THE much-increased CIA role in targeting and operation control is due more to its mystique than formal delegation of authority. The Agency is highly regarded by the military, both in terms of its general intelligence-gathering capabilities and its familiar-ity with Laos. The Air Force officers attached to the 4802nd Joint Liaison Detachment at Udorn-which coordinates Air Force and CIA functions-regard approval by the Agency as an index of their performance, and rarely oppose its recommendations.
As control of the air war has passed to those advocating a hard bombing policy, former Ambassador Sullivan's fear that the ground war would escalate along with it has been realized. Whether increased ground war is cause or result of the escalated air war is debatable. What is certain is that Laos now knows more war-above and below-than ever before.
( Copyright Dispatch News Service International )